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By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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RENAISSANCE PAST AND PRESENT

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RENAISSANCE has replaced Reconstruction as the hope of the future, for it is actual new birth we need for a new age, if in any really true sense it is to be new. So Renaissance has become everywhere our new watchword.[1] We hear of the renaissance of nations,[2] or even of groups of nations, of racial renaissance, of educational renaissance, of 'the renaissance of human values,' of the renaissance of science and philosophy.

But how far do we really understand what Renaissance is? There is only one sure ground on which to tread. The word is a historical word. It stands for something that has happened already in the past. Well, then, how did it happen? Why did it happen? What form did it take? What were its results? And were those results essential to it or merely accidental? That is, may we expect them to be repeated? Again, what does the word itself mean? Was it an epoch, or was it a crisis? What influences were at work to modify it? Was it something to be desired or dreaded? Is the word limited, as some limit it, to a revival of learning, to a return to paganism, to an artistic cult? Or is it 'Humanism,' and can Humanism be human in the widest sense, co-extensive with all human life, all human character, all human experience?

[1] See *The Coming Renaissance*, p. 213.
[2] E.g. *The Renaissance of India*, etc., etc.

The intense fascination of the whole subject becomes apparent by merely asking these elementary questions. Strictly defined, of course, renaissance means re-birth or new birth. It was first used to describe the great movement in the Middle Ages which changed the future of Europe. And one contrast with our own renaissance becomes at once apparent—the widened scope in an ever-widening world of the Renaissance of to-day. Whatever the Mediaeval Renaissance was, it was confined to a very narrow sphere. Italy was its birthplace and its home. From Italy, and from such men as Petrarch, Lorenzo de Medici, Nicholas V, Boccaccio, Michael Angelo, Francesco Fielfo, Pica della Mirandola, Vittorino da Feltre, Pius the Second, it received its distinctive hall-marks. Italy was the garden, like the garden of Boccaccio's Decameron, where it found leisure and strength to grow. In Italy it died, and there the Humanists found a grave to bury it. It spread indeed to other lands, and the Reformation in Germany, and Revival of Learning in England, are its fruits, but there it was an exotic.

On the other hand, the Renaissance of to-day is plainly co-extensive with the world; and it is a much bigger world than the world of the Humanists. If it is Humanism, it is the Humanism of all Humanity. Men write of the renaissance of India, of Japan and China, even of Africa, as freely as they speak of the renaissance of Western European nations, and with the same conviction. Though it is never strictly true to say that history repeats itself, yet history is always teaching through the past by parallels and contrasts. And the triumphs or disasters of bygone days are, as Dr. Ramsay Muir says, in speaking of 1763, not so much the climaxes of a finished story as the preambles of one unfinished still. What suggestive points of similarity, then, can we gather up from Renaissance Past to enlighten us as to Renaissance Present and Future?

I.

The Renaissance that closed the Middle Ages was not a crisis, but an epoch intensified and drawn to a climax by a crisis. The Fall of Constantinople in A.D. 1453 was certainly not its birth-

nour, for it preceded that by fifty years. The date of Dante's descent into hell' is as early as A.D. 1300, no less than 150 years before, and Dante has been compared to the pilgrim who hears at evening the bell which mourns the dying day. He is the sad singer of what is already passing, standing, with solemn, olive-crowned brows, as the janitor of already-closing doors. Just as,[3] in his immortal poem, he leads his pilgrim from the dank airs of the tomb into the second realm, with its sapphire sky and its bright and morning star, so, from twilight fields where men's minds had hovered for centuries, he bids them farewell, pointing them away from himself to the full glory of the advancing day. The Divine Comedy closes the Middle Ages while it preserves their spirit. To quote[4] Symonds' vivid words, 'It stands before the vestibule of Modern Literature like a solitary mountain at the entrance to a country rich in all varieties of landscape.' Yet no historian would deny that the Fall of Constantinople was the crisis which crowned the epoch by releasing for the West the treasures of Classical Learning. Chrysoloras, the Byzantine-born Greek, bore with him to Italy the priceless freight of all modern Greek scholarship. Nor did the Renaissance cease with its failure in Italy. For what Petrarch did for Italy, that in a wider sense Erasmus did for Europe. Petrarch became the father of Modern Poetry and of Humanism.[5] Erasmus became the apostle of the rights of reason, and employed the New Learning to liberalize the mind of Europe. He dealt Scholasticism its death-blow.

What we call the Renaissance of to-day bears precisely similar features. It is an epoch rather than an event. It describes a process of liberation, an awakening to self-consciousness and world-consciousness neither definite in its moment of origin or final as yet in its result. It is an era of gestation culminating in new birth, an 'outbreak of the human spirit' not confined to immediate but germinant results, to which we can put no exact time-limit. It began fifty or more years ago, with the remarkable advances of science both theoretical and practical. Darwin's *Origin of Species*, with the important results

[3] *Purgatorio*, Canto I.

[4] Symonds, *The Renaissance in Italy*, p. 50.

[5] Symonds and Bensusan, *Renaissance*, pp. 170-2.

already achieved in Biology, Geology, and Palaeontology, ha given a new view-point for the contemplation of the worl and founded Evolution as the principle of all true interpre tation of Nature. The theory of Evolution shattered the ol views of Sudden Creations and of Biblical Literalism, an broke away ramparts of Tradition hitherto supposed to be im pregnable against all free invasion of Thought into the reali of Revelation. Henceforth even Revelation itself must stan or fall by proving itself as, in some sense at least, scientifi and rational. Methods of scientific criticism and scientifi interpretation were boldly applied to the Bible. An age o Rationalism at first destructive, and only much later constru tive, followed upon an age of almost unquestioning faitl Meanwhile Man, by the application of science to life, w becoming master of the world. Electricity, Mechanics, Med cine, Agriculture, revealed new, wealth-giving secrets. Th principle of Liberalism in the world of politics created, fro the days of the Indian Mutiny onwards, new ideals and aspir tions which to-day are clamouring still for full satisfactio Nations awoke on every hand to self-consciousness. Greec Italy, Germany, America became the precursors of a worl wide demand for national self-realization.

Then, in the case of each Renaissance, a world-event, whi at first sight was wholly a world-disaster, precipitated a clim for which History had been long preparing. The Fall of Co stantinople released the long-buried treasures of Classic Lear ing, and brought the East to redress the inadequacies of t West. The collapse of Civilization brought about by the Gre War released everywhere forces already at work for person and national self-realization and freedom. Some will regard as wholly catastrophe; others, with wider vision, will mark in the travail-hour of New Birth. 'The tents of Humanity a struck,' General Smuts has written, 'and once again Manki are on the march.' At each of the three great crises of Histo which have ushered in the Middle Age, the Modern, and t Present, the Germanic Race has been the destructive pow which has broken up a Unity which had ceased to serve the b interests of Mankind. We may make again the mistake of P the Second and try to marshal the forces of reaction in

Crusade for the recovery of our lost Sacred Places. But the forces of New Birth will be all against us.

II.

Another resemblance between the Mediaeval Renaissance and our own is that each stands out as *the Daydawn and Awakening of Hope*. The description applied to the first Renaissance is as old as Petrarch, 'the ancestor of the Humanists.' 'I was born,' he wrote, 'as the dawn began to brighten'; and the saying is not only literally but historically true. For Petrarch, who died in 1374, is 'the Columbus of a new spiritual hemisphere, the discoverer of modern culture.' With the ruthless destruction of all culture by the Vandals in the fifth century, a deep night had fallen upon Europe. Mankind had been in a dungeon, chained like the Prisoner of Chillon, to pillars of tradition. 'During the Middle Ages,' writes Symonds, 'man had lived enveloped in a cowl, unconscious of the world of beauty around him.' And the Renaissance came and shattered his bonds, plucking off the veil and 'flashing the light of reality upon the darkened places of man's own nature,' thus liberating Reason from her bonds. There was in it all the joy and gladness that comes to the human spirit with returning light: *Dolce color d'oriental zaffiro*.[6] Humanity began to sing her 'Song of the Sun,' which Francis voiced. The joy of fresh and abounding hope entered, like some great day-spring from on high, into the hearts of man. From that date onwards, till the Sack of Rome in 1527—an overthrow which the sins of the Humanists themselves hastened—the Italian Renaissance flourished, with the promise of an ever-widening day. It was the first kindling of the mind to 'that spring-tide influence of which we see the first stirrings in St. Francis d'Assisi, to a new outlook, a new relationship with all nature, all history, all life—the awakening to a relationship which is universalistic, the sense of a living contact with all humanity, the joyous discovery that the world, in all its resources, gifts, treasures, and delights, is man's heritage, which men and women must share together.' The Revival of Learning was no mere resurrection of the past; it was the old Learning serving as the handmaid of the new Hope, gathering

[6] Dante *Purgatorio*, Canto I.

up the long-concealed treasures of a buried culture to hurry with them out of Aladdin's Cave into the sunlight of gay reality. 'I am set,' wrote Petrarch in his *Memorabilia*, 'as it were at the confines of two peoples, looking at the same time both backwards and forwards.' There was, indeed, no sudden cleavage with the past—it was Evolution rather than Revolution—for there was, as yet, no revelation of the possibilities of the future. But the human mind, realizing its freedom at last, whilst drawing strength and inspiration from the great masters of antiquity, used these now as 'a bridge to the full liberty of modern thought.'

This new vitality of hope always strikes one as the most attractive of all the features of the Renaissance of four hundred years ago. It marked the character of all the men who were true Renaissance leaders—Petrarch, Michael Angelo, Shakespeare, Spenser, Columbus, Erasmus, and, above all, Francis d'Assisi. For Francis, though belonging to an earlier age, was yet, in spite of his asceticism, 'the first and most complete expression and herald of the coming spring.' All its most engaging features showed forth in him. In him 'the discovery of the world of man, and the discovery of the world by man, go side by side with the quickened sense of God.'[7] 'Through sense he transcended sense; his vision in turn transmuted and deified the sensible world.' The Stigmata are there, but they are hidden. The Cross no longer repels with its horror and shame, but attracts by its sweetness and light, as in Fra Angelico's 'Crucifixions' with their warm spring backgrounds. The Order which he founded was borne on the wings of the new aspirings already quickening men's hearts, and in him, as his biographer writes, 'the new romantic temperament of the age, voiced by troubadour and crusader, was joyously carried into the service of religion, and shot through and through with spiritual values. The fraternity could not escape its birth-affinities . . . Its prevailing notes were freedom and joy.' There are multitudes to-day who, though heirs of all the ages, stand disillusioned of civilization, and disinherited of personal joy, but they are only waiting for such spiritual leadership to fall into line and 'follow the gleam.'

[7] Cuthbert's *Life of St. Francis*, p. 236.

III.

But the first Renaissance was also *a Revolt against Tradition.* It is here that we have the most suggestive and warning parallel to the Renaissance of our own day. In that lay its splendid vindication of the rights of Reason, its living protest against a dead Churchmanship, its true emancipation of the mind of Man. In that lay also its terrible dangers—the dangers which reaction always bring, especially when it is the reaction from ecclesiastical authority which can so easily lose its way in licence and moral anarchy. If Erasmus and Michael Angelo, 'the prophet and the seer of the Renaissance,' and Reuchlin, its typical savant and pioneer in Hebrew scholarship, and Melanchthon, 'the Humanist of the Reformation,' and Luther, its champion, and[8] Vittorino, the typical Renaissance schoolmaster, and Edmund Spenser, the perfect pattern of a Renaissance poet, and John Milton, the apostle of the 'Liberty of Prophesyings,' are examples of the first, then the Emperor Frederick, 'the Amazement of the world,' Cæsar Borgia, most shameless even of Popes, Olgiati, the assassin of Galeazzo ('who called to his aid in dying the divine manes of the departed Romans, whilst commending his soul to the Virgin'), Lorenzo de Medici, who hastened the fast-approaching doom of Florence, Sanazzaro, the Neapolitan poet who exalted sensuous beauty to the pitch of licence, Pius II, the opportunist, and many another are living embodiments of the ruin Renaissance spells if it once loses touch with its true source.

Yet, in spite of its worser side, the revolt was a good and necessary thing, and the same is true to-day. Pater speaks of it as 'an outbreak of the human spirit.'[9] It was the living protest against a religion which had kept the mind of man in watertight compartments, Faith having no fellowship with Reason, and half the soul being stifled with the creed that 'abstinence and mortification are the only safe rules of life.' It was the reaction from the ugliness and barrenness of the earlier Middle Ages. And it is surely most significant that it burst forth not

[8] See Creighton's *Historical Essays and Reviews,* 'A Schoolmaster of the Renaissance.'

[9] Pater, *Studies of the Renaissance,* p. 25.

among worn-out, decadent races, but from Italy, the mother, then, of virile and warring nations, vigorous, young, strong, and self-reliant. Here, between Alps and Mediterranean, energized and fought Goths, Lombards, Franks, Germans, and Italians, as the stronger races, European and Asiatic, fight in the wider world to-day, whilst the 'commanding dualism' of the Papacy and Empire held the lists. If it was 'the Age of the Despots,'[10] it was the Age of the Republics and Communes too—in fact of every variety of government—theocratic at Rome, democratic at Florence, monarchical at Naples, aristocratic at Venice, tyrannical at Milan. Was it likely that, with such political diversity, the minds of men would remain content with the old lifeless formulas (is it any more likely to-day?) or be terrorized any longer by an authority at that time false to the very righteousness that it preached to others? The Great Revolt came, which in Northern Europe was religious, and in the South, with the revival of the forbidden learning, frankly but good-humouredly irreligious. The long-closed doors were broken in. The Church condoned the boldness, under such leaders as Alexander and Julius II, on condition of sharing the spoils; and the Vatican itself became, from Nicholas V to Leo X, the nursery of the New Culture, and the hotbed of its heathenism.[11]

But the Revolt was not *merely* a revolt against old methods and time-worn prescriptions. It was 'the re-assertion of man's self,'[12] 'the rehabilitation of human nature,' the positive claim of the human spirit to think and decide for itself, the protest of the lay mind against excessive sacerdotalism. It was the struggle of Humanism with Authority; and the Humanism was bound to be victorious because the Authority had been long sapped of its living, inherent strength and quickening Christian principle. One can realize what it might have been in Italy by noting what it did become in England and Germany; but the Church had lost her lead—at the very moment when she alone could interpret and champion the movement for freedom wisely. So[13] 'it had to be destructive, because the old order had become

[10] Symonds, *The Age of the Despots*, p. 11.
[11] Pater, *Renaissance Types*, p. 43.
[12] W. H. Hudson, *Story of The Renaissance*, p. 7.
[13] Symonds, *The Catholic Reaction*, p. 410.

nfruitful, and must, therefore, be superseded.' Mediaeval eligion and modes of thought were on the point of ossifying hen Humanism intervened. 'All classes—from popes and rinces down to poetlings and pedants—seemed for a while to ave lost sight of Catholic Christianity, and so they could not liscern the close link of connexion which binds Renaissance nd Reformation.'[14]

We are in the presence of a precisely similar movement of he human spirit to-day, which may be either regenerating or lisastrous. It has been long preparing. Modern science has ostered it. Man's discovery of his own powers—and limitaions—has hastened it. The war has consummated it. The new, ritical, challenging spirit refuses to be silenced. The faith of o-day is a 'Faith which enquires.' Mankind will no longer live nder tutelage. To many it may seem that 'all the foundations f the earth are out of course,' and that we are hastening to ome vast catastrophe. To others it is the moment of regenera-ion, of the new and living birth of ordered freedom.

IV.

Lastly, that first Renaissance has been truly described as *a Recovery*, not only of the treasures withheld by an absolutist Church, but of the human spirit itself. In part, of course, the deprival was the result of the Barbarian invasions. But one cannot limit it to that. Rome had stamped her '*Verboten*' upon all but the narrowest scholastic culture. And the Revival of Learning, when it came was, in a sense, the recovery of hidden treasure, the tasting of forbidden fruit, the bold challenge of Modernism to the Church, the brave re-possession of disputed territory. Freeman describes it as 'a revolution hardly less than a second re-birth to the human race.' For it was the re-covery of Humanism, the large, bold claim of the human spirit to be free and untrammelled, to work out its own salvation in its own way, to replace with the new wine of life and liberty dog-mas which had grown time-worn, to reaffirm the right to think, to energize, to explore and master Nature at every point. 'The end of our Foundation,' says the Father of the House in

[14] Symonds, *The Catholic Reaction*, p. 418.

Bacon's *New Atlantis*, 'is the knowledge of causes, and the secret motions of things, and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire to the effecting of all things possible.' 'True philosophy,' another Bacon writes elsewhere, 'is that which is the faithful echo of the voice of the world, which is written in some sort under the direction of things—which is the rebound or the reflection of reality.' There lies the foundation of all Inductive Philosophy and Modern Science. The Church of the Middle Ages had raised a wall of partition between Thought and Faith, and had cursed with her ban all that lay on the further side. The New Humanists broke down the wall, or climbed it, plucked the forbidden fruit that overhung it; then, gathering boldness, had wandered at their peril, like Hylas or the Argonaut, into the maze of fragrance and beauty that lay unveiled before them. From that recovery dates the new and nobler outlook of Roger and Francis Bacon.

We are witnessing much the same recovery of man's spirit to-day. A new age is upon us, full of finer possibilities than the old, but what is needed to make them our own is, in leaders and people, sympathetic faith and spiritual insight. We must yield ourselves freely and trustfully to the spontaneity, the hopeful gladness, of the great daydawn. We must go forth like Petrarch, like Francis, with open hands and hearts to welcome it. Schiller speaks somewhere of how 'the measured dance of hours brings back the happy smile of spring, when the buried dead is born again in the life-glance of the sun.' That is what the Renaissance brought, what the New Renaissance is bringing to-day all the world over—not a new theory, a new polity, a new system religious or secular, political or social, or even a new philosophy, but a new awaking, a new vision, a new outlook, and, above all, a new life. It was, and is still, a resurrection, a new birth of the human spirit, and a recovery in the power of that resurrection. It was, of old, 'no mere political mutation, no new fashion of art, no restoration of classical standards of taste, no mere discovery of ancient books,' but a re-discovery of Man by himself, and in that re-discovery there lies the re-discovery by Man of God.

THE RESURRECTION APPEARANCE TO ST. PETER

By the Rev. R. V. G. Tasker, M.A. (sometime Scholar of C.C.C., Cambridge), Domestic Chaplain to the Bishop of Oxford.

NOT the least interesting feature of Canon Streeter's recent volume on the origin of the Four Gospels is the suggestion, which he puts forward that *John* xxi in general substance, though of course not verbally, is based upon part of the lost ending of *Mark*; and that it was added by the writer of *John* i-xx, partly in order to correct a misapprehension which had arisen concerning the future of the 'beloved disciple,' and partly to bring the Resurrection stories of his own gospel, in which the appearances take place at Jerusalem, more into line with those of Mark, where the scene of them is laid apparently in Galilee. Whether this suggestion is true or not, two facts in connection with the general subject-matter of *John* xxi seem to stand out quite clearly in the New Testament.

(1) There *was* an appearance of some kind or other of the Risen Jesus to St. Peter, which probably occurred in Galilee, and which may have been the first appearance of the Lord after His crucifixion. Not only have we the direct evidence of I. *Cor.* xv, 5, where St. Paul in his sober summary of the Post-Resurrection appearances places first the appearance to Cephas, and the evidence of *Luke* xxiv, 34, where the two disciples on their return from Emmaus are met with the words, 'The Lord is risen and hath appeared unto Simon': but the whole history of St. Peter, and in particular the fact that, though he had denied the Lord, he came to hold, as we see clearly from the *Acts*, the premier position amongst the early apostles in the initial stages of the Church's evangelistic work seems to demand some such intense spiritual experience as a vision of the Risen Lord would supply.

(2) Granted that such an appearance did fall to the lot of St. Peter, it would appear incredible if no mention of it had found a place in St. Mark's Gospel, which there is no reason to doubt

was based upon the memories of St. Peter's mission teaching? For although there is no direct or detailed reference to such an appearance in the sermons of St. Peter as recorded in *Acts*, it would appear almost certain that he must often have referred to it in St. Mark's presence, when he spoke, as every mission preacher must sooner or later speak, of his own spiritual history and experiences. There is thus every initial probability that the lost ending of Mark contained a story of this appearance; and as Canon Streeter has pointed out, this hypothesis finds support in the fact that the apparent depreciation of St. Peter in the Second Gospel seems to be leading up to a climax consisting of some great spiritual experience which stabilized once and for all the character of St. Peter, and turned the wayward Simon into Peter, the rock upon which Christ could indeed build His Church. Moreover, *Mark* xvi, 7, 'Go tell the disciples *and Peter*: "He goeth before you into Galilee: there shall ye see Him," seems to point forward to a narrative relating an appearance to St. Peter in Galilee.

It is not, however, our purpose to discuss whether *John* xxi is in point of fact based upon the lost ending of *Mark*, because the evidence is of course entirely inadequate to prove or disprove such an hypothesis, but rather to ask whether, granted that there was in the original Mark a story of an appearance to St. Peter, there are any traces of it to be found in the New Testament in addition to the story of *John* xxi. We should naturally expect this to be the case, for although the later evangelists may only have known Mark in the mutilated form which has come down to us, the story of the appearance to St. Peter must have existed and been widely known as a floating oral tradition, and formed the basis of many a sermon in early Christian days.

And first let us ask: 'From our knowledge of the character of St. Peter, and indeed from our knowledge of human nature generally, what should we naturally suppose to have been the essential factors in that great spiritual experience, which turned once and for all Peter the denier into Peter the devoted and courageous Christian missionary?' Surely we can to some extent, at any rate, reconstruct what would have been likely to happen. After the Crucifixion St. Peter, heart-broken and hope-

less, would return again to his work as a fisherman, picking up the old life again just where it had stopped before Jesus of Nazareth had called him away from it, trusting that work would be the best cure for his misery and grief. We may notice in this connection the words ὑπάγω ἁλιεύειν of *John* xxi, 3 (a study of the use of ὑπάγω in the Fourth Gospel seems to suggest a final withdrawal from one kind of life to another. Peter leaves behind him the life of a roving disciple and returns to his old work, just as Jesus 'returned' to the Father after the Ascension); and also the interesting unfinished sentence of the *Gospel of Peter* which may be based upon *John* xxi, but which seems more likely to have survived as an independent tradition. 'And I Simon Peter and Andrew my brother taking our nets departed to the sea, and there was with us Matthew the son of Alphaeus, whom the Lord . . . ' As the hours, however, passed by and the cowardice of his past action, refusing to allow itself to be forgotten, burnt itself deeper and deeper into the conscience of the apostle, it is extremely probable that a real repentance, as distinct from initial remorse, took place in the soul of St. Peter, and that then, while he was at his work but unable to put much heart into it, 'toiling all the night and catching nothing,' the Lord in a vision appeared to him. At the appearance of His Master he would at first hesitate to approach Him, but when once assured that he was really welcome we can well believe that he would rush eagerly towards Him, fling himself at His feet, confess his sin, and on being reconciled once again receive a new call, a commission to lead the little band of apostles in the work of Christian evangelization. In whatever fashion this spiritual experience may have come to St. Peter, it seems incredible that there should have been absent from it what we may call the factors of hesitation, welcome, confession, reconciliation, and commission.

Now there are three stories embedded in the gospel narratives concerning St. Peter, which I would urge are best explained as attempts to account for this experience in St. Peter's life. The Fourth Gospel alone attempts to give a detailed account of it; but it is utterly characteristic of the whole way in which that author narrates the story of St. Peter that, though he retains in his narrative the features of welcome and commis-

sion, he nevertheless omits the note of hesitation and the con fession by St. Peter of his sin, which we instinctively feel mus have formed part of the experience; for the question, 'Simo son of John dost thou love Me?' though it elicits a confession c devotion from St. Peter, does not draw from him a confessio of sin. In *John* xxi Peter plunges at once into the water a though the denial had never taken place, or was somethin which could be brushed aside and left unnoticed. But such i not the desire or the behaviour of the true penitent.

It is remarkable, however, that these two omissions fro *John* xxi seem to find reflection, one in *Matthew* xiv, 24-29, i the account of Peter's walking on the sea; the other in *Luke* v 1-11, in the peculiarly Lucan version of the story of St. Peter original call to discipleship.

Matthew xiv, 24-29, seems in Canon Streeter's view of Gos pel origins to belong to those Antiochian traditions which wer familiar to the editor of the First Gospel. May it not owe it origin to the symbolical language with which many earl Christian teachers and preachers might speak of the Resur rection appearance to St. Peter? He had come back to his Lor across the troubled waters of conscience, hesitating at firs indeed, as was natural, to do so, and waiting to receive th summons of the Lord to the sinner. 'Lord, if it be Thou, bi me come to Thee across the waves. And He said, Come.' The there follows the experience of utter helplessness and inabilit to calm the storms of a troubled conscience (compare the word ἀρξάμενος καταποντίζεσθαι), and the cry of help (κύριε σῶσόν με and then the outstretched hand of the Saviour. The whole stor is indeed admirably suited as a symbolic description of a experience such as we feel must have fallen to St. Peter's lo in the early hours after the Resurrection of Jesus. And wha an admirable subject for a mission sermon in early as in late Christian days! We are, I think, apt to forget the fact tha many of the stories in the Gospels have survived just becaus they were originally the symbolic language of early Christia sermons, though in many cases they have in the process of tim ceased to be parables and assumed the guise of historical de tails. This seems to have been the case with the parable of th Fig-tree, which became the story of the Cursing of the Fig-tree

and we may well believe that in the case of *Matthew* xiv, 24-29, what was originally a symbolical account of a spiritual experience has become a 'nature miracle' of considerable intensity. In its present position this passage clearly interrupts the Marcan narrative, which the author is copying, for he follows *Mark* closely to the end of verse 27, and picks up the Marcan narrative again, after this insertion, at verse 32.

In the story contained in *Luke* v, 1-11, which on the surface seems to be recorded as the history of St. Peter's original call to discipleship, we find not only the note of hesitation, but also the note of confession. Peter, when brought face to face with Jesus, falls at Jesus' feet and cries, 'Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.' The whole of this narrative seems inexplicable if we are to regard it as an historical account of the original call of St. Peter. It seems much more probable that it is based upon a symbolical story of his re-call after the Resurrection. The many connections which this narrative seems to have with *John* xxi have often raised the suspicion in the minds of scholars that the Lucan version refers ultimately to the same incident as the Johannine; and it is interesting to notice that the story in *Luke* gives just that note of hesitation and confession, which we have already noticed is absent from *John* xxi. If, moreover, *Luke* v, 1-11, is indeed a genuine historical account of St. Peter's original call, how is it, we may well ask, that it found no place in St. Mark's Gospel, but that that gospel contains another and quite different story of that event? Surely St. Peter must often have referred in his preaching to such an all-important event as his first meeting with Jesus, just as most of the Old Testament prophets base their authority to teach upon an initial call, of which in many cases they give some account. Is it likely that St. Peter would have failed to refer in his teaching to the miraculous draught of fishes, if such an astounding occurrence did really accompany his first meeting with Jesus? Or that Mark, who shows no dislike of miracles, should have failed to record it in his Petrine Gospel? Once again, is it psychologically probable that St. Peter, meeting a strange teacher on the seashore for the first time, would at once have fallen down at his feet, and made a confession to him of sin? Admirers of Professor Otto's book, *Das Heilige*, may tell

us that here is an instance of that *mysterium fascinans tremendum*, in which that writer finds the essence of religion. Peter is at once attracted and arrested, and yet awed and overwhelmed by the 'numinous' element of the person of Christ. But surely this is to read back into the figure of the historic Jesus a feature which He never possessed, though such a reading back may be inspired by the highest feelings of devotion and seem to find support from the familiarity of Christians with the Logos-doctrine, particularly in that form of it popular in Christian devotion, which is in reality Apollinarianism. Jesus was born and lived amongst men we may be quite sure not to compel them to become His disciples by a magnetic 'numinous' compulsion, against which in reality no resistance was possible. He had too great a respect for the personality of others for that. His aim was to win them by attracting them by the utter persistence of His own spotless character. And the 'numinous' element in holiness in the ethical sense in which Christianity speaks of holiness is something which cannot be seen at a glance even by the most acute of observers.

The fact then that *Luke* v, 1-11, seems so out of place as a story of the original call of St. Peter, and has elements in it akin to *John* xxi, and other elements which we feel must have had a place in the experience of the resurrection appearance to St. Peter, leads us to suppose that, like *Matthew* xiv, 24-29, it is influenced by early Christian stories referring to that event.

We need not be surprised that such an astounding misplacement should have taken place in regard to these narratives. Symbolical teaching in those early days easily developed into concrete historical narrative, and there was always a tendency to read back into the past conditions and events which in reality occurred later. It is therefore not unnatural that stories connected with the Peter of the Post-Resurrection days should have been echoed in the accounts of his dealings with his Master before the Denial and Crucifixion. This reading back of present events into narratives of past events is seen more clearly perhaps still in the other details of the stories in *Luke* v, 1-11, and *John* xxi, to which as yet no reference has been made. These narratives seem to reflect not merely the story of the Resurrection appearance to St. Peter, but also his activities as a

pioneer Christian missionary in Palestine, and possibly at Corinth[1] and Rome. If the appearance took place while St. Peter was actually fishing, it was no long step to the story of a miraculous catch of fish, symbolizing the souls of men, which as a matter of fact St. Peter did actually catch. The fact, moreover, that Jesus had said to St. Peter, as we see from the Marcan account of the story of the call, that He would make him and his brethren 'fishers of men' was an additional incentive to the creation of the story. It was only after the Resurrection (compare ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν of *Luke* v, 10) that the real launch into the deep, the evangelizing of the Gentile world, was made. It was at the command of the *Risen* Lord that the nets were let down for a draught. And the most amazing thing was, as the fourth evangelist clearly saw, that though there were so many converts made of all sorts and conditions of men, 153 different types if not more! yet was not the net broken. The Church remained intact, wisely controlled by its first 'fishers of men.' Such an explanation need not of course deny that there was actually a large catch of fish made at the time of St. Peter's original call, and perhaps also on the occasion of the Resurrection appearance. The point, however, which I wish to emphasize is that the narratives of *Luke* v and *John* xxi seem unintelligible unless we realize that they reflect a symbolic language in which early Christian teachers referred to the Appearance of the Risen Jesus to St. Peter, and his pioneer work as the earliest and most liberal Christian missionary, who broke away from the narrow conception of the school of James, and opened the flood-gates to admit the Gentile world into the Church of Jesus Christ.

[1] *Cf.* I. *Cor.* i, 12, though that passage can of course be adequately interpreted without assuming that St. Peter actually visited Corinth.

THE MODERN CHURCHMAN AND HIS LIFE OF DEVOTION*

By the Rev. H. J. Trueman, M.A.

The Dean of St. Paul's in his great work on Plotinus has warned us that 'Christianity is essentially a struggle for an independent spiritual life, and it can only exert its true influence in the world when it realises that spiritual things are spiritually discerned, and when it stands on its own foundations, without those extraneous supports which begin by strengthening a religion and end by strangling it.'

In a similar strain Mr. Barry, in his book on Christianity and Psychology, reminds us that 'after all, a religion abdicates any claim to men's spiritual allegiance if it shuns the glare of daylight reason and draws its blinds when the sun is up.'

For us, as Modern Churchmen, I suppose the sun is up: as Churchmen we are responsible for seeing that Christianity does exert its true influence in the world, and it is therefore our task to see that as far as we are concerned our religion shall not be strangled by such doctrines and observances as shall hinder men's spiritual allegiance or put obstacles in the way of our struggle for an independent spiritual life.

To cultivate that, we shall be agreed, we must pursue what has been called the life of devotion, and for simplicity's sake we may say that that includes Prayer, Bible Study and Public Worship with its highest expression in the Eucharist, and it is the object of this paper, not by any means to assume that Modern Churchmen need to be exhorted to cultivate such obvious means of grace, but rather to pull up the blinds and fearlessly face such difficulties and misunderstandings respecting them as might make them seem unreal or unhelpful to us, and to gather up a little of the modern thought which may make it easier for us whole-heartedly to give our spiritual allegiance to this devotional side of our Christianity.

* A paper read before the Hertfordshire Branch of the Churchmen's Union.

There must be, it has been remarked, 'great varieties of religious temperament'; 'there are some' (the latest volume of the Modern Churchmen's Library says), 'who feel purely rational compulsions to belief in God; there are "God-intoxicated" men who cannot help being religious; there are others whose moral nature has simply been won by the appeal of the Jesus of history. Many are the lights on the way to the City of God—rational, spiritual, moral, emotional, practical,' and we for whom 'the sun is up' have to keep our minds open to what is called the scientific method, to mystical experience, to metaphysical philosophy, and psychology, to the historic sense and constructive criticism, as well as to Comparative Religion and aesthetics, and not least to the spirit of the age and the deeper rationalism.

With so much then that might baffle or delude us we need to guard carefully against what Plato called 'The lie in the soul,' and I will cite a sentence from Oman which at the outset will put our subject in the right light.

> 'Prayer, Word, and Sacrament are still the means of grace, yet only as they are moral means adapted to moral ends, and not merely as they are devices or vehicles or impressive doings.'

There is, of course, no disparagement of the spiritual value of these expressions of the devotional life in the emphasis on their *moral* significance. The point is rather to insist that we must be on our guard against what Mr. Barry calls the 'danger of institutional religion,' which is 'to make the means into an end in its own right,' whereas all our religious exercises should act as a man's spiritual dynamic and 'train him to know and do the Will of God.' This understanding and performing involves seeking God as our Teacher and our Inspirer, making intelligent use of the means of grace, not superstitiously, but for a double purpose—'one to send a man informed and alert to his tasks, and the other to float his soul off its sandbars on the rising tide of spiritual reassurance and power.'

Our constant object must be to be better men, to be better able, as the Collect suggests, 'to please God both in will and deed'; and if we are to be fully equipped servants of God we need Canon Streeter's stern reminder—'Nothing is nobler than the impulse which moves man to offer up his best and dearest

to his God; nothing more pathetic than the delusion that he must first slay the thing he offers—whether it be his firstborn in the flames of Moloch, or his reason at the altar of Christ.' With our reason undimmed we may well find a dynamic in the life of devotion, for there is, we have been reminded, a transcendent life which streams upon us from the altar as from the silence of the hills, and buds also mysteriously within the soul; but it is given us not for our own sakes, but 'rather that we may follow in the steps of our pattern and go back to entincture with new goldness the desirous world of men' (John Cordelier).

I have long felt that to be one of the most inspired and inspiring sayings, but the way for us Modern Churchmen, and indeed for all Christians, to have this new goldness to impart, is, as we have been told, to 'spend time in the company of Christ,' for 'man's deepest need is spiritual power, and spiritual power comes out of the soul's deep fellowships with the living God.' There is a profound and delightful significance about that plural, 'fellowships': in any close comradeship worth the name, there must be many and varied avenues of approach and points of contact. We cannot limit our fellowships with God to what we name 'religious observances': the 'essence of mystic communion with God,' we find Mrs. Herman saying, is a contact such as 'can only be expressed by saying that it is a permeation with the Body and Blood of Christ,' and 'such sacramental contact is, of course, not confined to sacramental observance: it consists not in partaking of the Eucharist, but in a Eucharistic life.'

This, you will agree, is another golden phrase, and we find here no obscurantism, no touch of magic, no strangling of the freest life of buoyant, unfettered religion. It implies an open outlook, an eager anticipation of heavenly gifts, a divine enlightenment, a glad spirit of generous adventure: 'Grace laughs at our little barriers; our artificial separation of sacred from profane'; and the Eucharistic life means walking as it were in childlike gaiety and trust on the level 'of every day's most quiet need' with our hand in Christ's.

We need not grope after that Friend and Companion amid the mists of a dim past: Christ has risen, we are encouraged to remember, 'and gone before us into the future . . . and we,

entering an era of psychological discovery, find Him in front, awaiting us at the gate of a new day.'

That is the beautiful utterance of our regretted teacher, Lily Dougall, but we are brought to an even closer realization of the Divine Presence than finding our Lord at the gate of a new day, by that other illuminating woman teacher, Mrs. Herman, who has also recently gone from us, when she says, 'There is an altar in men—a deep and majestic place—where the soul transacts with its God, and life is cleansed and kindled with unearthly flame.' That is the Altar we should wish to worship at—we whose minds are hungry for God's truth and yet who wish to keep the unearthly flame alight that others may warm themselves with the glow of our devotion.

And so we welcome as an opportune discovery this statement, 'It is not with the eye of the mind that we see God, but with the love of the heart':—we need a religion which, like Origen, we have learnt leaning on Christ's bosom.

With such general reflections, then, to re-establish our confidence in the reasonableness and value of the devotional side of our Christian life, let us turn to the three special modes of its expression—Prayer, Bible-study, and Public Worship.

As to Prayer first. In his valuable Psychological Study of Christianity, Mr. Barry affirms that 'The formation of religious habits is of really primary importance in the pilgrimage towards moral freedom'; and with a truly divine sense of humour remarks, 'Saying our prayers is like smoking or writing home: if we drop the habit we lose the taste for it.' And Oman, also with a light touch, dogmatises, 'Prayer is not bombarding God for acts of omnipotence which, otherwise, He might withhold.' But we come to the heart of the matter in Dean Inge's solemn reminder, 'Prayer . . . is the elevation of the mind to God, and we cannot pray unless we believe that the mind is capable of being so elevated'; but he adds in another place, 'Prayer naturally, spontaneously, issues in action. Action is the normal completion of the act of will which begins as prayer'; and those of us who love to learn and feel it a privilege to teach must be grateful for his telling us, 'The true scholar, who, as has been said, "goes to his desk as to an altar," will do his work

better, not worse, than he who does not consecrate his daily work by prayer.'

I am sure, however, that we are likely to approach this profound subject from different angles, and it may be helpful to remind ourselves of various utterances about Prayer: one will perhaps seem to be complementary of another.

Mrs. Herman wrote that 'its primary motive is to unite the soul with Him Who is the Source of all benefits,' and yet 'true prayer will always end in intercession.' J. M. Thompson says: 'The believer in prayer . . . feels that God has taken his poor superstitious idea of prayer and educated it: that the asking for definite things has more and more given way to the habit of putting oneself entirely in God's hands and seeking only to know and to love: that prayer is, in fact, personal communion with God.' These two may appear to be reconciled by this further philosophical account of prayer:

> 'When once we realise that prayer is entirely personal, that it brings about a responsiveness in a man which enables God to use the normal antecedents of his life (without any miraculous interference) in an abnormal way, and to produce results of which they would otherwise have been incapable, then the difficulty disappears.'

And to some the purely psychological account of Prayer will most appeal:

> 'We should quietly affirm to ourselves all the endowments of whose need we are most conscious, ourselves simply confident and expectant in the light of this great certainty of God.'

But there have been things said about prayer which, I think, come home to our hearts more intimately than apologetic or quasi-scientific explanations like these, valuable though they be, and I will offer three of these sayings. Here is one:

> 'Prayer is either communion with God or it is nothing . . . . The adventurous soul is the soul that has the courage to relinquish every task, however good in itself, which unfits it for that sustained gaze into the face of God that is its very life.'

Here is a second:

> 'No spiritual act is complete till it has been first prayed and then done. And after that comes the call to a purer prayer and a nobler act. Such is the spiral stair by which a man may ascend to heaven.'

And this shall be the third and closing pronouncement about what has been called 'The characteristic act of the Christian'.

> 'Prayer in its essence, is not the preferring of this or that particular petition: it is the opening of the whole heart and mind to the incoming

of the love and energy of God: it is a deliberate taking hold of the life of God, not only for myself and my own profound needs, but also, through a kind of vicarious receptiveness, for the needs of other human personalities with whom I am consciously or subconsciously linked.'

To turn now to that other department of the life of devotion, the use of the Bible, and recalling the reminder of the Editor of the *Modern Churchman* that our aim is to achieve 'a synthesis between Catholicism and Protestantism,' we may seek enlightenment from a leading Anglo-Catholic first, and later from a representative Evangelical. Bishop Carey is afraid of Sacraments without the Bible, and says 'they are twin keys, when rightly understood and used, to unlock the treasure house of a deep, weighty, devoted Christian life and character,' and he confesses that he 'shrinks from the type . . . which reads all sorts of rather exotic and overstrained books, but knows nothing of the solid sanity of the Gospels.' There is something reassuring in the Bishop's words 'weighty' and 'solid' in these two pronouncements, and they should give us courage to face the most fearless enlightened criticism of the sacred books without any anxiety as to whether the Truth of God can possibly undermine what we like to think of as the Word of God; especially as we are reminded by one of the mystical school, 'All genuine critical scholarship has a spiritual goal. It only needs the man of insight and vision to transmute it into a force which reclaims and re-creates great tracts of Scripture for our age': and it is Canon Vernon Storr, who shrewdly points out that 'There is a truth of fact and there is a truth of idea. God uses both to make His revelation known. Criticism has helped us to distinguish between them, and for this we owe it a real debt.' It is because we Modern Churchmen are alive to this double aspect of truth that we can be confident with this devout teacher that 'The man who will thoughtfully and prayerfully read the Bible, letting its message sink into his heart, will be troubled by no doubts about its spiritual value.' It is true we have to examine ourselves as to the genuine motive with which we come to our Bible Study to make sure that it is the 'spiritual value' that we want, for it is only then that we can say with Bishop Boyd Carpenter, 'It is not the question of the authenticity or historical accuracy of this passage or that: it is the question whether the

soul of man can find its home in the heart of the great Father of all'; and as he was one of the enlightened we are not surprised to turn the page and find him playing with an image we have come across before, as he remarks, 'We no longer need to read the Bible with the blinds of our intelligence half drawn down!' Why should we, when 'the Sun is up!'

But, after all, it should not be exhortation that we need to induce us to know our Bibles—not in these days when the old Book has been made so much more enthrallingly interesting and intelligible and useful by the new light which has been shed on it: and I will close this section of our subject by a passage from Dr. Fosdick which must surely find an echo in the heart of any Modern Churchman who knows how much he needs what God's care has provided for him—a lamp to prevent his stumbling and a light to show the path ahead—and finds his joy in searching the Scriptures because he has discovered that they testify of that Christ whose very life is his. This is what he has written:

> 'There is no book to compare with the Bible in the realm of religion. Most of the books we read are like the rainwater that fell last night, a superficial matter, soon running off. But the Bible is a whole sea—the accumulated spiritual gains of ages—and to know it and to love it, and to go down beside it and dip into it, to feel its vast expanse, the currents that run through it, and the tides that lift it, is one of the choicest and most rewarding spiritual privileges that we enjoy.'

And now to turn to Public Worship and its highest expression in the Holy Communion. Mrs. Herman will give us an easy transition in her remark that 'Communion which is not communion with Him who opens all Scriptures and feeds the growing soul of discipleship with words of eternal life is sheer superstition.' We need our alert intelligence in this department of the life of devotion quite as much as in any other. 'Worship,' the same writer has said, 'is adoration and devotion, but it does not live by mere adoration and devotion; it feeds and grows upon the worshipper's enlarging apprehension of the truth. No mere emotional fervour, no blind sacramental communion, can take the place of a mind stretching towards the truth and thus being purified to moral penetration, disciplined to intellectual gravity, kindled to spiritual splendour.'

Let us again recall the witness of the high sacramentalist: Bishop Carey says, 'No wonder men won't worship the Great

Policeman or the great Ecclesiastic (which God is to many). I wouldn't. No wonder their service of Him is more or less bored slavery. But who can help worshipping truth, and love, and goodness; and yet they are He, and He is they.'

Worship, then, is to be an intelligent communion with a real and lovable Person. And it should have a double object: to express the pent-up emotion of our hearts and to inspire us to altruistic service. 'The position of the religious dilettante,' says Mr. Barry, 'desiring the emotions of religion as an end in their own right apart from religious actions, is really comparable to that of the gourmet cultivating the food-pleasure and not regarding the satisfaction of his hunger as the end of his activities'; and it was S. Bernard who asked, 'What is it to eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man, but to live the life which He lived in the flesh?'

This leads us to the very heart of things, and 'It follows that the centre of our worship cannot be mere praise and adoration, or confession and intercession, or teaching and inspiration; cannot be anything less, indeed, than united partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ, and the offering of our own bodies and souls as a living sacrifice.' 'The Communion,' says Mrs. Herman, 'is indeed more than the Sacramentum of pledged soldiers of the Cross; but unless it is that first of all, it can be little more than a pious symbol, where it is not a magical superstition.'

With similar imagery Mr. E. S. Woods has remarked:

> 'The true significance of each Holy Communion is missed unless it is regarded as the receiving of God's life for the doing of God's work, the bread eaten being veritably "the ration-bread of God's army," and the wine drunk "the stirrup-cup of God's saints."'

It is just the magical view of Holy Communion that seems most dangerous and most deadening to the real value of the Sacrament, but such views of it as these are far enough away from any reliance on mere magic, though some would value the further safeguard of this other wise warning:

> 'When we speak contemptuously of mere symbols and insist that sacraments are special operations of grace, vehicles and not symbols, we are merely setting the working of omnipotence above the gracious personal love of our Father, which is the same as measuring a token of love by its material value.'

In full accord with that point of view is this saying from Liberal Evangelicalism:

> 'A sacrament although it does not create, fosters the maintenance and development of the spiritual experience or state out of which it arises, and of which it is the expression. A clasp of the hand is meaningless except as a token, an expresion in act, of a feeling of friendliness; but it also, in helping that friendliness to find expression, helps to maintain and increase it.'

And yet, though on the surface there may seem to be a contradiction, we may well accept Dr. Inge's declaration, 'A sacrament is more than a symbol. A symbol leads us from the lower to the higher; a sacrament brings us back again to earth, but infuses a heavenly meaning and divine potency into common things and actions.' This too is a point of view utterly opposed to any thought of magic, and may well prepare us for what shall be our closing reference to this subject of worship and the Eucharist—an echo indeed of a profound utterance which was quoted earlier in a slightly different form: 'While sacramental theories may differ, the sacramental life is the immutable condition of the Christian's communion with God.'

'The Sacramental life'! That seems to suggest that we should ask before we close—is that what we Modern Churchmen really desire? We have found good reasons to justify our pursuit of the life of devotion, we have seen from what different points of view it may be approached and we have seen what value may reside in those obvious expressions of it, Private Prayer, Bible Knowledge, and Community Worship; but can we still find practical reason to desire to live 'the sacramental life' which is the condition of the Christian Communion with God, and which both expresses and nourishes itself through Holy Communion and Bible Study and the intercourse with God which we call prayer? Is it for us what it seems to be under different forms for 'Catholics' and for 'Evangelicals'? Surely it should be at least as highly valued by us, with the richer and deeper content we believe we can find in it! 'It is the soul's deepening insight into truth translated into holy living that gives to the offering of body and soul in worship its character and value,' and it is for that insight that we look to the Spirit of Truth Who is our Guide. His Pentecostal gift we are reminded 'shall sting us above all to service . . . and the

earnest of a life that has attained to its full stature is this—the arduous communication of the secret of Eternity to other men in a language that they can understand—the language of Science, the language of Beauty, the language of Love—bridges flung out on all sides between the soul of the disciple and other souls of all races, grades and faiths, universal and exuberant self-donation: that is the mark of our acceptance as Fellow-craftsmen with Christ.' What an ambition for a Modern Churchman—to be an interpreter such as that for those whose blinds are not yet up! And one who has studied the intricacies of the human mind has declared, 'The so-called "Modernists" are modernists because of their reverence for the Catholic Faith and their evangelical desire to propagate it.' But we have been reminded that 'Religion is caught rather than taught; it is the religious teacher, not the religious lesson, that helps the pupil to believe': that, then, is our work, to live out the divinely imparted knowledge we have, and therefore we have been well admonished, 'It is difficult to maintain a high standard of work without spiritual pride, unless one believes in God and kneels often at His feet.' That is the true way to learn, 'to believe much more thoroughly than we do in the divinity of common life and in the nearness of God to man,' for as another has said, 'Those who live with the life of Christ and share His sacrifice, are those who bring the true meaning into the daisies and its joy into the lark's song; they are the people who make the world young wherever they live and die.' How simple it is, and yet how profoundly satisfying to eager heart and adventurous mind—'to live with the life of Christ and share His sacrifice'! And that is the summing up of the life of devotion; a life 'not of vision merely, but of self-oblation,' a life such as to make us 'fellow-craftsmen with Christ,' because we believe in 'the divinity of common life'!

And so I will finish by quoting once again from our President:

> 'We shall serve our Church and our country best if we perform day by day and hour by hour, those humble and simple acts of self-dedication which will build up in us "that mind which was also in Christ Jesus" . . . for self-consecration is the effectual way by which we can serve God in our generation. This is the way in which the torch has been handed on by the long succession of runners since the Gospel of Christ came into the World.'

A FELLOW-WORKER WITH THE TRUTH*

By R. W. Macan, D.Litt., sometime Master of University College, Oxford

THE service, at which we have just assisted, had for its object the commemoration before God of your late Vice-Principal, Cyril William Emmet. That object is also to be furthered by the Memorial Tablet, fixed in the Chapel wall and shown there to-day for the first time; and upon it rests the consecrating touch of the service just accomplished. And further: your Principal has laid upon me the duty—which is also a privilege—of marking the occasion by a few words of appreciation of the man, whose memory this tablet will long, but very inadequately, preserve. To attempt such a task is to emphasize the loss which my College, and this Hall, and the Church of England—to say nothing of his family and personal friends—have sustained by what we, poor pur-blind mortals, might be forgiven for calling his untimely death. But on this point I will only say now that it behoves us in such a case rather to dwell on the joys and benefits, which have been granted to us in such a friend or colleague, and to give thanks for the good life which has made, and makes, our own better worth living.

Emmet was brought back to Oxford, for service in College, at a relatively advanced age: *nel messo del cammin di nostra vita*. He was, indeed, nearly ten years older than Dante had been at the opening of the *Divina Commedia*: but he was, though ripe in mind and character, and a mature scholar and theo

*An Address delivered in the Chapel of Ripon Hall, Oxford, on November 21st, 1924, at the unveiling of a Memorial Tablet to the late C. W. Emmet. The inscription on the tablet is as follows:

IN MEMORY OF
CYRIL WILLIAM EMMET, B.D.,
FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD,
AND VICE-PRINCIPAL OF RIPON HALL 1919—1923 A.D.
HE DIED TO OUR GREAT LOSS IN
NEW YORK, U.S.A., ON 22ND JULY, 1923,
IN THE 48TH YEAR OF HIS AGE.

συνεργὸς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.

logian, young for his years in body and in spirit; and very quickly more than justified the hopes of those who had recalled him from a rural pastorate to a citizenship and a service—or host of services—for which he proved himself eminently qualified. I feel sure that Emmet regarded our invitation to him as in the nature of a divine call: *As he was following the ewes great with young ones He took him: that he might feed Jacob his people, and Israel his inheritance*—and it was no mere shepherd-lad with sling and stone that came from West Hendred to Oxford in 1919, but a Knight of the Holy Ghost, well equipped for all his tasks.

If we review, however briefly, Emmet's life and work previous to his recall to Oxford we shall, I think, conclude that he was exceptionally well prepared for the duties which he undertook among us, and, humanly speaking, apt to make the most of a great opportunity. Born eldest son of a large family in a parson's modest home—in such homes how much of the best and most gallant life of the nation has hitherto been nurtured!—Emmet had even from early days to make his own way in the world. From St. Paul's School he came to Corpus with a college scholarship, followed the regular Honours course in Classics, and six months after taking his degree was ordained to a curacy in the East End. He was never at a Theological College, and I cannot discover that he ever sat at the feet of any Gamaliel, or owed his theological methods and results to any one Doctor of Divinity. But he was an industrious and constant student, even during his eight years as curate, first at Plaistow, and afterwards for six years in an equally slum-ridden district at Notting Hill, where every forenoon was consecrated to study, even if the rest of the day was to be given up to visits, boys' clubs, and those multifarious good works which are the life of saints and the ruin of students—as a rule! . . . At the close of that period he volunteered for service as a missionary in Japan: a courageous and devoted intention which, surely, lets in a flood of light upon his mind and character. But it was not to be! He had, meanwhile, contracted a marriage—one of those (let me just say in passing) made in heaven—and domestic circumstances, primary ties and duties (on which you will not expect me to enlarge) made the

fulfilment of his intention impossible. The offer of a college living came just then to relieve the situation, and for nearly fifteen years he was the dutiful country parson, earning the gratitude and affection of his rural flock and neighbours—the funeral at West Hendred in August, 1923, was witness of that —but able withal to devote more time to theological study, and to make himself an expert master of New Testament criticism. Emmet was, no doubt, in a certain sense, a self-taught theologian: as late as 1910 he still called himself an amateur; but he had (so far as I can judge) few if any of the defects of the 'autodidakt'! Certainly, he was not deficient in self-confidence; but he had no littlenesses, or personal piques, in his handling of theological or religious topics; and he gradually became, through various articles and publications, known as a rising exponent of modern and better methods in theological research. His parish at the foot of the Berkshire Downs was so situate as to afford him opportunities of associated study and production with friends in Oxford and the neighbourhood. He took part in the discussions and joint undertakings which have given Cutts End, at Cumnor, or, as I might venture to phrase it, 'the church that was in the house of that elect lady Lily Dougall,' a place, even if a humble one, in the recent history of the Anglican communion. I had heard him read and speak at meetings of the Oxford Society of Historical Theology with manifest competence and point, and he had proved himself (I might almost say) the life and soul of those Churchmen's Conferences which were beginning to declare a greater liberty of prophesying for the Church established in this realm. But the clearest tribute to the breadth and competence of his theological equipment you may see in the invitation addressed to him by the late Dr. Hastings to undertake the compilation of a Student's Dictionary of Theology—to be a one man's job. That invitation he accepted, and had actually completed the MS. when he was taken from us. It is one of the many deplorable consequences of his death that there seems no one now to guarantee the printing and publication of that work, to which he had devoted powers, and hours, which might have been bestowed on immediately rewarded labour with more advantage to himself.

We knew, when we elected Emmet to a Fellowship at University, that we were bringing to Oxford a vigorous and competent theologian, who would make an individual contribution to the resources of the faculty in the University, and would be a strength and ornament to our College: but we could hardly have expected a man of Emmet's age and experience to take his place in our society as Junior Fellow so modestly, so deftly, so naturally, living in college during term —really living, not merely 'pernoctating'—and bringing a sympathy, good temper, loyalty, comradeship and sagacity which were simply above price to bear on every question of college administration and discipline. He was Dean, too, at the date of my retirement, and for the summer term of 1923—while my distinguished successor was unavoidably absent—Emmet had to undertake many of the responsibilities of a *de facto* Head: and though I was no longer behind the scenes, and was indeed at a distance, I have understood that our *locum tenens* made it seem only too easy to do without a Master, past or present!

Emmet's virtues, especially as a teacher and pastor, must, I suppose, have been hardly less in evidence for Ripon Hall than for University College. I attended, with his consent, a course of lectures introductory to the *Acts of the Apostles* delivered one summer term, and will only say now that each lecture left me sorry that it was so short, and that the end of term came all too soon for one at least of his hearers. He was lucid in exposition and argument, and the matter grew vital and interesting in his hands. He understood the charm of economy—that is, of not saying, or trying to say, too much at a time. What his method was with pupils *privatim*, in the so highly extolled tutorial hour, I had mainly to conjecture. But he was a very human person: manly, sincere, yet expansive: and from his tutorial reports I judged that he considered and individualized his pupils, and respected every genuine effort, even if sometimes rather disappointed by the results.

Emmet was a clerk in Holy Orders, a priest of the Church of England. Sociable and expansive as he was, I do not think he ever forgot his dedication, nor did others lightly forget it in his company: but he was in his work and in his outlook rather the prophet than the priest. Your true prophet can never be

in complete agreement with the present, nor even with the past: he is necessarily critical of both: he is in essence a Futurist: his critique of the present and the past will involve or imply a forecast, a prediction. He desires to be, and is eminently συνεργὸς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ—synergic with truth, *cooperator veritatis* (for we may here err with the Vulgate)—seeing that the prophet never can assume that traditions or institutions have exhausted, or fully set forth, the truth whether in word or in life: must always be a seeker after a newer and clearer and fuller expression of truth, in whole-hearted reliance on the Master's promise: ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς—*The Truth shall make you free.*

But it cannot be too clearly understood that Modernism—a somewhat vague and elastic term, which Emmet nevertheless accepted as a description of his own method of study and teaching—covers and carries with it a new apologetic. Modernism is not a religion, it is a defence of religion, and of the Christian religion: it is an attempt, so to speak, to bring the Christian apology up to date. That is, at any rate, what it is and will be in Ripon Hall; and what it was with your first Vice-Principal. Naturally there is room in Modernism for considerable varieties and divergences of theological positions, and of religious experience. Of the latter, in Emmet's case, I would not be so presumptuous as to essay any estimate—beyond avowing that no one, who was favoured with his friendship, could doubt the depth and sincerity of his religious feeling. But as a theologian he was, I take it, anything but an extremist. His methods were scientific—his judgment was well balanced, his criticism 'sane and unflinching'—and he was far from being the victim of the last brilliant hypothesis. I need but remind you of his dissertation on *The Eschatology of the Gospels* (a subject which he had made his own), or refer you to one of his last published utterances, the *Critical Verification* in the volume, entitled *The Lord of Thought*, which he published in collaboration with Miss Dougall the year before their scarcely divided deaths. Emmet described himself (in 1910) as 'trying to combine the old faith with the new critical methods.' Others, moving on the same lines, may find themselves carried further from traditional moorings without compromising, at least in their own view, their Christianity or their Churchmanship. It is

the rare and almost unique prerogative of our English branch of the Catholic Church to leave its children—at least the adult laity—virtually unrestricted intellectual liberty, combined with the use of a noble liturgy, and a wide range of devotional practice and aids to faith. If our Church has not seen its way to dispense altogether with doctrinal or what I should call rationalistic tests for its priests, yet in practice our clergy enjoy a freedom not much inferior to that of their lay brethren, and, to do them bare justice, often render a much better account of it. This liberty makes such characters and services as Emmet's possible; and this Hall exists (I take it) to foster and promote the conditions favourable to the development and multiplication of such ministers of the Church and servants of humanity as he was—faithful, it may be, in few things, but worthy to be entrusted with many things—who shall unite in their own lives, as pastors and fishers of men, the prophetic with the priestly office, in however humble an *Imitatio Christi*. And the mission of this Hall will be successfully maintained and enlarged, under God, just in proportion as the methods and spirit and character and example of Cyril William Emmet, its first Vice-Principal, are kept in vivid remembrance, or at least in constant action—*συνεργοῦντα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*.

THE MEANING OF THE LAST SUPPER

By the Rev. T. F. Royds, B.D., Rector of Haughton, Stafford.

THERE are four accounts of what our Lord said at the Last Supper, and no two of them are in exact agreement. All four contain the words, 'This is my body,' but the received text of *Luke* xxii has, 'This is my body which is being given for you,' and I *Cor.* xi has, 'This is my body which is for you.' Matthew and Mark omit, 'Do this in remembrance of me.' The words about the cup differ more widely. Matthew has, 'This is my covenant-blood which is being poured out for many for remission of sins.' Mark omits 'for remission of sins.' Luke has, 'This is the new covenant in my blood, and it is being poured

out for you.' I *Cor.* xi omits 'being poured out,' and adds, 'Do this as often as ye drink, in remembrance of me.' Some scholars hold that the text of *Luke* xxii has been assimilated to that of I *Cor.* xi, and was originally shorter. Codex Bezae omits verses 19*b* and 20. In any case St. Paul's is the earliest account, and according to him the words, 'This is my blood,' etc., should run, 'This cup is the new covenant in my blood.' Such words cannot possibly suggest a change in the cup or the wine other than a change of meaning and value, or a change of use and purpose. Obviously the words, 'This is my body,' must be interpreted in the same way, not stressing the unemphatic copula 'is,' which would not appear at all in Aramaic. Dr. Moffatt translates, 'This *means* my body.'

Now what did the apostles understand by the words? Our Lord was present with them, His body still unbroken and His blood unshed. They could not have taken Him to mean that the bread and wine which He then handled *became* or *contained* in any sense that body which they saw before them. The symbolism would be plain enough to an Eastern mind. He was giving them something to take the place of the sacrificial system of the Old Covenant. It was a New Covenant, made not with the blood of bulls and of goats, but with His blood about to be shed on the Cross. The breaking of the bread symbolized the breaking of His body. It was a simple feast of fellowship and loving remembrance, to be at once a 'means of grace' or source of comfort, and a thanksgiving. There was no fencing it around with sacerdotal regulations and a precise form of words without which it would be 'invalid.'

What then becomes of the immense superstructure of eucharistic doctrine which the Church has built upon this primitive love-feast? The elements do not remain *mere* bread and wine after consecration, any more than the wedding ring remains a *mere* piece of gold. They are changed, as Jeremy Taylor puts it in his admirable treatise on the Real Presence 'as a table is changed into an altar, a house into a church, a man into a priest, Matthias into an apostle, the water of the river into the laver of regeneration.' More than this cannot fairly be inferred from our Lord's words. As Westcott says (*Life*, Vol II, p. 354), the best illustration of them is the words, 'I am the

bread of life,' and 'I am the true vine.' There is a useful parallel in II *Sam.* xxiii, 17, 'the blood of the men.'

And what of the offering of the Holy Sacrifice? The sacrificial interpretation of 'Do this' (*Poieite*) is, as the Roman Catholic commentator Estius says, without lexical warrant 'and clearly beyond the mind of the Church' (*et plane praeter mentem ecclesiae*). The same is true of 'in remembrance' (*anamnesis*), and of 'proclaim the Lord's death' (*katangellete*). If a sacrificial sense be read into any of these words, what is the sacrifice supposed to effect? Does it propitiate the wrath of God? If it be so interpreted, it is either paganism, or Judaism reappearing in Christian garments. Does anyone believe that the wrath of God can be averted from his sins by an imitation of a Jewish sacrifice, with bread and wine for flesh and blood? It is even doubtful whether the great prophets of the Old Testament approved of sacrifice at all. 'The fictitious and constructive offering up of a phantom body and phantom blood is a degradation of the Holy Communion to the unreal mimicry of a sacrifice, which if real would now be heathenish.' (Hort, *Hulseans*, p. 214). It is far more likely that God is propitiated by an Ober Ammergau play than by so pale and bloodless an imitation of Calvary. The only sacrifice recognized by the Prayer Book is the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, and the reasonable sacrifice of ourselves, our souls and bodies. Apart from these the Holy Communion is not a sacrifice, but a feast upon a sacrifice. 'Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us, therefore let us keep the feast.'

Savages prefer a God that they can touch, taste and handle; and civilized man sometimes turns out to be a well-dressed savage. The successful localizing of God in food and drink is one of the triumphs of Western theology, but it is a 'throwback,' and modern science has created an atmosphere in which it must sooner or later perish. Our greatest Anglican divines have not been ensnared by it, and it flourishes best among moderately educated people. The country labourer does not believe in it because he does not understand it; the philosopher does not believe in it because he understands it only too well. Hooker knew what he was about when he said that the real presence of Christ's body and blood is to be sought for not in

the sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the sacrament (*Eccl. Pol.*, v. 67). But let us not forget that even here we are using metaphor. We do not mean the actual body and blood of Christ, which could not give spiritual nourishment even if they were present, nor do we mean a presence of Christ in the brain or other organs of the receiver. We mean that the faithful communicant is brought into the closest possible union with Christ. We mean what Scripture means by such words as 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them,' or 'I in them and thou in me,' or 'Christ in you the hope of glory,' or 'Christ liveth in me.'

The position outlined in this short article may be summarized as follows. (1) The doctrine of a localized Presence in the bread and wine collapses when brought to the test of Scripture and common-sense. (2) The offering of a sacrifice must be understood in the Prayer Book sense. We offer ourselves to God and to His service after the example and in the Spirit of Christ. (3) The Sacrament is a feast of fellowship with the Master and our fellow-disciples, *i.e.* a communion and a real means of grace. (4) The Sacrament is also a Eucharist, or thankful remembrance of Christ's death and of the benefits which we receive thereby. We offer the sacrifice of thanksgiving as well as 'our alms and oblations.'

We shall never commend the Holy Communion to the great mass of non-communicant Church-people by trying to assimilate our doctrine to that of Rome, or to the supposed needs of human nature. We must reconstruct our teaching, if necessary, on 'Back to Christ' lines, and trust psychology rather than metaphysics. The experience of millions proves that in this Sacrament we can really 'feed on Christ' in our hearts by faith: the experimental proof is the final one, and it is sufficient.

MAN'S APPROACH TO GOD[1]

'One God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in all.'—*Eph.* iv, 6.

THE first and great commandment bids us 'Love God.' But, inasmuch as we cannot love one whom we do not know, it is perhaps well to ask ourselves first what exactly we mean by '*knowing* God.'

That is a tremendous question, and a sermon, especially a lay sermon, is hardly the occasion for attempting a full and systematic answer. I wish to urge that it is a very practical question, and one which ought to be faced, and to offer some considerations which may help towards a practical answer. Moreover, it is a question which probably many are asking, however inarticulately, and no answer will serve them which merely offers a conventional formula. Thus it will not suffice to reply that the knowledge of God is revealed in Jesus Christ, that, if we know Him, we know the Father also. That *is* the answer, but it needs to be further explained and developed: otherwise the difficulty is only moved back a step. For 'to know Jesus the Christ' cannot mean only to have such knowledge *about* Him as we obtain from the New Testament record of the Jesus of History: that at least was not what S. Paul meant by 'knowing Christ.' It is the Christian belief that the Spirit of Christ is ever with us, so that to 'know' Him is to recognise Him as 'the Way running through all human experience,' as 'the universal Truth,' as the 'Life of all creatures that live.'[2] But how are we to recognize Him, so that, knowing Him, we can attain to the knowledge of God?

This age of ours, restless as it is, and disturbed by the appeals of almost endless forms of belief or unbelief, is at least marked by sincerity: if it is called on to accept this or that creed, it wants to get behind the words. It is perhaps dangerous to generalise about any age, but this is surely at all events broadly true, and that it should be so is one of the most hopeful signs in a period not too rich in hope. The question is being asked, perhaps more widely than ever before: 'What

[1] A sermon preached in St. Edward's Church, Cambridge, on Dec. 7th, 1924, by Sir Arthur Hort, Bart.

[2] See *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, by the late Prof. F. J. A. Hort.

is the meaning of Life?' and, less than ever before, are the questioners willing to be put off with words, however consecrated by venerable usage and tradition. Men and women on all sides are demanding that religion, if it is to explain life, should have a definite relation to their experience, should cover the whole field of life, and not merely be a special secluded compartment in it. If at the outset of their enquiry they are told that religion means 'to know God,' they will ask in what sense that is possible. (They will ask other unspoken questions, but we may select this as fundamental.) Clearly in this mortal life a man cannot 'know' the Unseen as he knows his comrade: nor can he be content wth the assurance that here he can only know in part, while complete knowledge belongs to a further state of being. He will insist on learning how it is possible to know even in part, how he can be sure that such knowledge is not an illusion, how he can make even a beginning. There is indeed a widespread demand for a Faith which in the first place shall be utterly sincere, and in the second shall be as broad as life. Now, if we are to be quite candid, can we feel that the Christian faith is always presented in such a way as to answer to these reasonable requirements? As to sincerity—are not its pronouncements too often encumbered with phrases and formulas which to many clear-sighted minds do not seem quite real? And, as to breadth, does our religion always offer itself as something coterminous with life? May it not often be called rather 'a separate province of emotion'? Of course there are, thank God, thousands of Christians holding nominally a somewhat restricted view of Christianity whose profession is nevertheless absolutely honest and whose lives are permeated with a religion which is wider than their theology. But, numerous as they are, they are still the exceptions, they are not *typical* examples of Christianity.

A somewhat outworn philosophy of the Universe used to teach that there are three realities—Nature, Man, and God. But we can no longer draw so sharp a distinction. We can no longer think of God as a Being outside of, exclusive of Nature and Man, since it is through Nature and Man that alone in this present life we can know Him. There is truth in the old saying that 'like is known by like,' and the Finite cannot directly know the Infinite. This is not to deny revelation,

though it may be that our idea of revelation needs widening. God is revealed in Nature and in Man, above all in the Supreme Man: apart from Nature and the minds of men, culminating in the Mind of Christ, the word 'God' is but an abstraction like the 'Absolute' of the philosophers. No doubt many, in all the Christian ages, have felt that they have a direct consciousness of God, that, apart from the witness of Nature and History, He speaks straight to their souls. This mystic intuition is too well attested for anyone to deny its reality: indeed some would take the rather dangerous line of disregarding Nature and History, trusting entirely to the direct experience. But, apart from the fact that the experience is exceptional rather than normal, it may be questioned whether it is ever really independent of the media of Nature and Man. For Man again is not something outside Nature: he is a part of Nature, he cannot get outside the evolutionary process which has made him what he is. If then the mystic claims that God speaks to him directly, it is because he is himself part of that created world, which is the expression of God in time and space.

Here we come up against one of the ultimate mysteries, a mystery probably as insoluble by finite minds as the mystery of evil. In the light of modern knowledge we cannot but believe that God is *in* Nature, including Man—is, to use the technical term, immanent. Yet we feel bound equally to recognize that somehow He is *outside* the world, so to speak; in the technical phrase, that He is transcendent. If we maintain either that He is *only* immanent or that He is *only* transcendent, we find ourselves in worse difficulties than if we hold that in some way which we cannot at present fathom He is *both*. For our present purpose it is enough to note that it is only as *immanent* that we can in this life know Him, through that world which, in the old phrase, is His 'vesture,' and of which we ourselves are part. To some rare spirits He speaks more immediately 'as a man speaketh to his friend,' whilst most are readers rather than hearers: they read His writing, even though the words are not always easy to recognize as His, in the book of Nature, and in the Story of Man, culminating in the Divine Man, and He Himself guides their reading. But what both reader and hearer learn to 'know' is God as shown forth in His Creation, God as He is revealed under the limitations of Time: 'on earth the

broken arc, in heaven the perfect round.' But how, to be more precise, are we to recognize the Divine? Though we cannot account for evil, it is clear that everywhere in our experience it distorts the image, which, as S. Paul says, 'we see in a mirror dimly'; that is, distorted by reflection on to a metal surface which, being imperfect, cannot give a perfect picture. There is a famous analysis, which may help us to answer: God is revealed to us as the Supreme Goodness, Beauty, and Truth. Now, if this threefold revelation were not merely assented to as a statement with which no Christian can very well quarrel, but really grasped and acted on in all its applications, our religion might have a wider scope, it might be seen to be as broad as life, since it takes account of all those objects of human endeavour which we feel to possess real 'value.'

The three terms Goodness, Beauty and Truth, answer to the three faculties which we recognize in ourselves, though we do well not to regard them as mutually exclusive—the moral consciousness, the aesthetic sense, the appetite for knowledge. But we are apt to limit religion to the first, and to consider it *only* as a matter for our moral nature, whereas, if we feel, as we surely should do, that the sense of beauty and the desire for knowledge are *from* God, they also should lead us *to* Him.

The more limited view is perhaps largely due to the Old Testament, which, incomparable as an introduction to religion, needs to be supplemented by other parts of the complex Christian inheritance. The people of whom the Hebrew Scriptures tell, had an ethical sense unique among the nations: to them was revealed alike the righteousness and the mercy of God. Nor is it likely that in any British presentation of religion that side of it will be ignored or belittled: a religion which does not make moral conduct its prime concern falls far indeed below the Christian faith, whose ideal is perfection and whose motive is love. Still, if we are candid, we must admit that, even if conduct be as much as 'three-fourths' of life, it is not the whole of it. It is our moral sense itself which tells us that Beauty and Truth are also 'good.' The appreciation of these we owe chiefly to that nation which, next to the Hebrews, has contributed most to human progress, the ancient Greeks. Matthew Arnold perhaps went too far in pressing his contention that his countrymen need to qualify their Hebraism with more

of the Hellenic spirit: yet British Christians have still something to learn from one who, if in his public utterances he seemed to show an undue flippancy and an airy disregard for feelings which, if narrow, were deep, yet in his private life was a devout servant of God. One has heard religious folk almost apologise for caring for things because they are beautiful, whereas, if Beauty is one of the means by which God is revealed to us, the training of taste to a right appreciation of colour, form, and sound becomes part of a religious education, while ugliness in the surroundings of our lives should be fought against as well as vice; of this side of religion Ruskin, needless to say, was the prophet to the last generation, and no one would accuse him of being indifferent to the moral side of life; but it can hardly be said that his message has been yet assimilated. Let me quote a few sentences from a yet living thinker who is not by profession, as it were (like Ruskin), a champion of the Beautiful:

> 'I do not think that we have any right to assume that God is a purely ethical Being. The True and the Beautiful seem also to be roads up the hill of the Lord, as well as the Good; and though we are fully convinced that they all meet at the top, we are doing considerable violence to parts of our experience if we determine rigorously that God can have no other motive in His creation except a purely ethical one. Much of Nature's plan impresses us as a work of sublime intellect and ingenuity, but not as a scheme in which these are wholly subordinated to moral evolution. And is it not more than probable, judging from what we see around us, that Beauty also must be an end in itself to the Creator of our Universe? It seems to me that Truth and Beauty are ideals too august to be ever regarded as means only. Science and art are both false to themselves if they suffer themselves to be mere handmaids of morality. Writers on religion and morals generally regard it as a point of honour to prove that conduct is the whole of life, as if any other interest was unworthy of God. But if a large measure of intellectual and aesthetic interest is a worthy ingredient in the highest human character, if it is an enrichment and adornment enhancing the value of the most saintly life, why should not the same qualities, infinitely magnified and exalted above all impurities and imperfections, hold a place in the character of God Himself? I do not see why they should not; and I see many reasons for thinking that they actually do. The kind of ethical obsession which dominates many religious thinkers is, in my opinion, the cause of errors and defects in their view of life.'[3]

The applications of these bold words are manifold. All ugliness is a hindrance in the search for God: it is part of our religion not to deface, or, so far as we can help it, allow to be defaced, the beauty of His world: in the setting of our daily

[3] *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, by the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D., pp 17 *f.*

life, our houses and our streets, as well as in our Art and Music, we shall not tolerate what is ugly and vulgar; we shall read our Ruskin again, and, forgiving his superlatives and his economic eccentricities, we shall try to take him seriously, because we realize that we shall be following him along one of 'the roads up the hill of the Lord.'

Then again there is the quest for Truth, the third of the three mountain roads. The search for Truth is not confined to those who have a definitely theological end in view: the philosopher, the historian, the student of natural science, to name but the most obvious examples, are, or at least may be, seekers after God, inasmuch as the object of their enquiries is the Truth about His world and the doings of His creatures. And, the more single-minded is their search, the less it is distracted and disturbed by preconceived ideas as to what they will find, the more truly religious will their occupations be seen to be. *All* Truth is God's Truth, even if we cannot always see where the many paths by which it is sought converge. Many of the seekers no doubt would not admit that God is the object of their search. But there are indications that more and more men of science are coming to the belief that a spiritual view of the Universe is not inconsistent with the investigation of the truth about some part of it: materialistic theories as to the ultimate explanation of things, have, we are assured, lost much ground of late: they are challenged from various sides by subtle thinkers who are not controlled by any theological prejudice. May I remind you of one sign of the times which is surely full of interest and hope? In August of this year a Conference was held at Oxford between theologians and men of science to discuss 'the scientific approach to religion.' A series of remarkable papers was read by men eminent in various branches of science. Many things that were said were no doubt tentative, some perhaps imperfectly thought out: the papers were meant for discussion, not as statements to be accepted as authoritative, except as to matters of ascertained scientific fact. But, apart from what the speakers said, the noteworthy thing was that such a Conference, which, as its President said, would have been impossible fifty years ago, should have taken place at all. There was no attempt to make little of the difference between the theological and the scientific point of view: but theologian and man of science

each listened to the other with respect, and the same reverence marked the utterances of both. It seemed to be taken for granted that both parties to the debate (if indeed it is right to speak of 'parties' at all) were sincere in the views that they expressed, that both were genuine seekers after Truth; and the quest of Truth is ultimately the quest of God.

Such it seems to me (and I am merely trying to put together things which others have said) is an outline of the way in which religion may be seen to be as broad as life, since it takes account of all in life that has absolute value. Few would refuse to admit, at least on reflection, that the three roads of Goodness, of Beauty, and of Truth are the three approaches of mortal men to God. Yet in our practice we do not for the most part act up to this generous faith. As to the path of Goodness we have no doubt, and for that reason I have not dwelt on this road, which we feel to be the main road. My point, to repeat it once more, is that if we act as though Goodness were the *only* road, we unduly narrow the scope of religion, while we leave Beauty and Truth unexplained. The 'ethical obsession' of which Dean Inge speaks may, as I have suggested, be due to the influence of the Old Testament: but it is equally from the Old Testament that we should learn not to draw too hard a line between 'religious' and 'secular.' It was an old Greek who said 'the world is full of Deity,' but while he spoke to his countrymen almost with an air of paradox, the Hebrew race as a whole viewed everything through the medium of religion, while holding fast to the belief that God is 'over all' as well as 'in all.' Small wonder if, when religion does not appear to touch the main interests of their lives, it seems to many an 'extra' with which they can dispense. It was no modern speculative thinker, but S. Paul who proclaimed that God is not only 'over all,' but 'through all and in all.' If we are to 'know' Him in this present life, we must seek Him through all and in all, in Nature and in the minds and spirits of men, guided in the search by the spirit of the Perfect Man which He promised should be with us to the end of the world.

Just thirty years ago last Sunday there passed away in this place one whose life was a witness to the breadth of religion. Speaking from this pulpit, whence the most revered of Dr. Hort's teachers, Frederick Maurice, once taught, a son may

be forgiven if he briefly recalls the memory of the great scholar and thinker, some of whose thoughts he has striven in this discourse to develop and apply. I cannot make bold to claim that the applications are such as he would have approved; but I know that such truth as my own crude utterances may possess comes from a frequent study of his Lectures, 'The Way, the Truth, the Life.'[4] I know also that his religion was utterly sincere and was as broad as life. When he was a country clergyman and later as lecturer and professor here, the work to which he had been called was the first charge on his time and thought and was done with a rare thoroughness and the most scrupulous of consciences. Yet throughout he threw himself into the pursuit of knowledge of many kinds, besides the special studies for which his name will long be remembered. Botany and geology were among his recreations, and he read widely in philosophy, history, and general literature: as the tablet to his memory in Trinity Chapel records, he 'sought Truth before all things and through all things.' Nor was he less devoted in his quest of Beauty in Nature, Art and Literature. To him, I think, the three roads up the hill of the Lord were as one, since for him religion was, in his own words, no 'separate province of emotion,' but the atmosphere in which he breathed.

Let me close with one or two pregnant sentences of his which bear on our subject:—

> 'The Gospel itself can never be fully known till Nature as well as Man is fully known: . . . the manifestation of Nature as well as man in Christ is part of his manifestation of God.'
>
> 'The unfaltering faith in truth is, next to the faith in Christ crucified and risen, perhaps the power in man on which the future of human welfare most depends.'
>
> 'The truth of God revealed in Christ calls not for the separate exercise of an unique faculty, but for the co-operation of every power by which we can read ourselves and hold converse with whatever is not ourselves.'
>
> 'The world of nature can no longer be (to us) an alien world. On the strength of the knowledge already securely won . . . we must henceforth as men feel a true kinship to the earth and to all that lives upon it.'
>
> 'Not alone in our highest act of Communion are we partaking of heavenly powers through earthly signs and vehicles. This neglected faith may be revived through increased sympathy with the earth derived from fuller knowledge, through the fearless love of all things.'

[4] See *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, by the late Prof. F. J. A. Hort.

BOOK REVIEWS

VILLAGE MODERNISM*

Under the title 'New Light on Old Paths' Mr. Webling has published nineteen sermons delivered by him in Stansfield Parish Church. Stansfield is a village in Suffolk, and the sermons are described as 'simple and short addresses on religion and life.'

Mr. Webling has found by personal experience that 'the "modern spirit" has penetrated into our retired country districts, and a sympathetic attempt to approach the great facts of religion from the viewpoint of the twentieth century experience is welcomed rather than disliked.' The first part of this statement is confirmed by the remark of a parishioner in the West country who greeted her new and most peaceable incumbent by saying, 'I hope you haven't come here to disturb us.' Be that as it may, the 'modern spirit' permeates all, consciously or unconsciously, through the newpapers and the school.

Mr. Webling's book will be of interest in particular to two classes of people. First, those who have to preach to village congregations; and, secondly, those who declare the new prophecy in sermon and learned article to a wider and more cultured circle. The latter will find their teaching reflected as in a mirror. It is a faithful mirror, but one which simplifies. The simple religious strength and the simple religious weakness of modernism come out quite clearly. This was not Mr. Webling's intention, and, paradoxically, this is why the sermons have this particular value.

In his intention of making a translation of the new prophecy suitable to a village congregation he has succeeded admirably. He has set himself to build on the ideas already in his hearer's minds, and he does not depart from his rule. He has borne in mind the moral of the remark of his parishioner who excused her absence from church under previous incumbencies by saying, 'You see, sir, I am rather slow of understanding, and when I did go to church I never could make out a word of what the gentlemen used to say.' The sermons have an easy simplicity of style and thought, together with a certain persuasiveness. They are essentially moderate. They charm because they are sincere and free from pretentiousness. Mr. Webling is often happy in his use of analogy, especially in the sermon where the Gospels are represented as portraits rather than as photographs. His scheme is to start with the common experience of human life and bring to it the Gospel of the Kingdom as an interpretation of life and as a call to service. He deals in nine sermons with the 'Founder of the Kingdom,' His Achievements, His Interpreters, His Challenge, His Enemies, and His Victory. He goes on to discuss Paradise, Prayer, the Church and the two Sacraments, and ends with a return to the triumph of Christ and with the Holy Spirit as the King's Bounty to his people. The course is comprehensive: the setting is traditional: the contents modern.

Sir Oliver Lodge writes an introduction, and much use is made of spiritualistic phenomena. Mr. Webling thinks that 'psychic research has already made out an unanswerable case for the continuance of life beyond the grave.' In a note he claims not to have confused continued existence with eternal life. That is quite true: but it can be objected that the emphasis in religious teaching should always lie on eternal life and not on

**New Light on Old Paths*, pp. 158. Rev. A. F. Webling, A.K.C. (Skeffington. 3/6.)

continued existence. To emphasize the latter brings out a vista of endless possibilities of future reform, and this inevitably blurs the sharp urgency of the moral issue. Further, the plain teaching of the history of evolution about our ancestry, and of psychology about our instincts, suggest that the 'King's enemies' require much more attention.

But disagreement with parts of his book must not obscure the fact that it is no small achievement to translate the complicated speculations of modern theology into a religious message proper to the village church. This Mr. Webling has done. And since we believe that the new prophecy, whatever its human inadequacies, is of God, so these faithful addresses must have been a vehicle of inspiration to those who heard them and may yet be to a wider audience. H.G.M.

DR. SELBIE'S PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

Dr. Selbie's recent volume, *The Psychology of Religion*,* inaugurates the series of Oxford Handbooks of Theology, edited by the Bishop of Gloucester. It may at once be said that its comprehensive learning well entitles it to that position of honour. A more conscientious book would be far to seek. Dr. Selbie seems to have read and used everything of importance—English, French, and German, and it is not the least merit of his work that it serves to bring together so great a mass of material, both psychological and ethnological. As a guide to the literature it must remain for some years at any rate, one of our standard books. Its defects, such as they are, are less the fault of the author than of a subject in which there is as yet little coherence of standpoint or of usage in terminology.

The first point to be noticed is that the title of the book is ambiguous, with an ambiguity that is not without significance. A book called the *Psychology of Religion* may clearly either give us a psychological account of the nature of religion, or a descriptive account, not necessarily by a psychologist, of what the psychologists have to say about religion. Dr. Selbie's book falls at once into the latter class. It is full of material drawn from a very wide field, and by no means all psychological, together with a *critique* of the explanation of this material given by various psychological writers. It is, of course, of very great importance that we should have such collections of facts, and though Dr. Selbie has hardly superseded Professor J. B. Pratt's great book, *The Religious Consciousness*, he certainly supplements it in some directions. For these facts are the empirical basis of any sound psychology of religion, and some at least of the modern psychological systems do them less than justice. But when Dr. Selbie discusses them it is less as a psychologist than as an apologist for Christianity. We realise throughout that the answer will come right in the end.

And thus to read this book in the expectation of finding a consistent psychological account of religion is to court disappointment. There is urgent need for such a book. The brilliant attempt by William James in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is only a beginning. It was, indeed, doomed to failure by its arbitrary choice of material and its emphasis upon the abnormal. Since then the descriptive method has held the field. Writer after writer has used the material gathered by Starbuck and made familiar by James. What we now need is a book written with a full and just appreciation of these facts, but starting from the psychological end and resting upon a sound psychological system. For that we are still waiting, and perhaps must wait for a time, until the rival schools have fought their battle out a little further.

**The Psychology of Religion.* (Clarendon Press, 1924. Price, 12/6 net.)

We cannot, then, blame Dr. Selbie for not giving us a psychological system. There are plenty of true and important comments on the general problem. He sees clearly the importance of remembering that psychology is a science, and that, as such, its primary function is descriptive. To recall that psychology, philosophy, and history, have separate functions immediately turns the edge of much psychological criticism of religion. Dr. Selbie, following Professor Webb, rightly discards the pseudo-historical treatment of religion as a purely sociological phenomenon by M. Durkheim and his friends, and he gives a very useful general criticism of the 'New Psychology,' though it is more than doubtful whether he really does justice to the extent of the influence of the sub-conscious in perfectly normal lives (if the word 'normal' is one which has any definite meaning).

But we must confess to some feeling of disappointment that Dr. Selbie gives us so little guidance on point after point of vital importance. In some cases indeed there is real confusion. The discussion of the 'complex' on pp. 9-11 begins by quoting from Tansley a definition, based on the use of the term by Dr. Bernard Hart. In this sense the complex is a perfectly normal constituent of all human life. But Dr. Selbie goes on in the next few sentences to criticise Tansley on the basis of a totally different conception of the complex, assuming its pathological character. There has been no small debate among psychologists as to the proper use of the term, but that is no justification for the confusion of two well-known usages.

Dr. Selbie's failure to give a clear account of the complex is perhaps connected with the absence of any satisfactory reference to the formation of sentiments, a conception due to Mr. A. F. Shand and of the first importance for a psychology of religion. The word is mentioned on p. 125 in a non-technical sense, and in the technical sense on p. 41 and in quotations from Dr. Hadfield (p. 229 note) and Professor McDougall (p. 231). But nothing is said about the all-important distinction between sentiment and complex. And this carries with it the further result that though Dr. Selbie very rightly stresses the need for distinguishing between sin and moral disease, he does not explain in what the distinction consists. The only really relevant passage is the reference in a footnote to Dr. Hadfield.

Similarly we get no clear guidance on the vexed question of the existence of a religious instinct. Such a sentence as '. . . belief (*i.e.* in God) arises naturally from the working of man's religious impulses' (p. 128) needs very careful exposition before it can be regarded as psychology, and the preceding pages, of which it is a summary, make it by no means clear how these impulses are to be defined and classified.

It is perhaps unfair to complain that we get no discussion of Spiritual Healing, beyond an abrupt and contemptuous dismissal of the Emmanuel Movement and Christian Science—a twice-repeated collocation (pp. 82 and 290) which is hardly fortunate or fair. But in a descriptive account of religion we might surely have expected not merely a paragraph but a chapter devoted to the astonishing growth of healing movements, which are of the first importance for the psychology of religion in view of the intimate inter-relation between body, mind, and spirit which they reveal.

A final point of criticism is as to the use of the terms 'auto-suggestion' and 'hetero-suggestion' in connection with prayer (pp. 222 *f.*). Dr. Selbie seems to have been misled by M. Coué's exceedingly confused language, and there is no clear dividing line between the two words. How are we to analyse such a sentence as: 'If, too, on the physical side, the power of auto-suggestion is greatly increased by hetero-suggestion, as seems to be the case, so the spiritual effect of prayer will be found to depend on faith in the Deity to whom it is addressed'?

It will be seen that these points in which Dr. Selbie's book invites criticism are in almost every case points in which the professional psychologists are themselves in no little confusion. The terminology of the subject is imposing, but it is also chaotic, and it is no matter for wonder that traces of chaos remain even in so careful a sorting out of the material as Dr. Selbie has given us. For the labour that has brought together so much for our study and illumination we owe a real debt of gratitude.

L. W. GRENSTED.

CHRISTIANITY AND RACE.*

Mr. J. H. Oldham, Secretary of the International Missionary Council, has written a book the importance of which at the present time it would be difficult to over-estimate. No thinking man to-day can fail to see that all our problems are world problems, that age-long barriers have been broken down, that for good or ill the world has become a unity. Still less can we ignore the uncomfortable fact that mechanical and scientific progress has not been accompanied by any corresponding moral and spiritual advance.

The temper of the book is definitely Christian. That is to say, its author believes that the Christian view of life is alone adequate in face of a situation of unrivalled complexity and undoubted menace. If he is an optimist, his optimism is grounded in a respect for facts, a passion for truth, and a willingness to face difficulties and to weigh evidence, which render his judgments both sane and trenchant. Further, he has been at pains to study exhaustively the writings of men with whose conclusions he disagrees, and knowledge of details is found linked with a power of wise generalisation, a capacity for sympathy with opposing view-points, and an ability to seize on the essential factors of a problem as stimulating as they are unfortunately rare.

Mr. Oldham has a profound distrust of catch-words and one-sided theories. He penetrates with unerring directness into the root causes of racial antipathies, and his conclusions are of the first importance. He believes that racial animosities are not instinctive, but are due rather to factors economic, political, and temperamental, factors, that is to say, which are capable of clear analysis and ultimate removal. While admitting the significance of race and the importance of modern discoveries in the field of heredity, he will have us recognise the no less vital influence exercised by environment, education and social inheritance. Nor, above all, must we ignore what is aptly termed ' the autonomy of the living individual.'

Again, while far from denying the present fact of inequality whether between individuals or races, our author rightly points out that before the question of innate inferiority can be helpfully discussed we must first agree on some common standard of measurement, and secondly make sure of our capacity to estimate with some degree of correctness in the case of any people which of their qualities may properly be called innate. Moreover, though differences admittedly exist, they are differences within a fundamental unity, and the deepest divergencies will be found not between race and race but between man and man.

The intricate problems arising out of human relationships are treated with a sense of fairness which cannot be too highly appreciated. The problem of India, for example, is discussed with penetrating acuteness

**Christianity and the Race Problem,* pp. 280. J. H. Oldham, M.A. (S.C.M., 1924. Price, 7/6.)

If, says Mr. Oldham, complete and sudden separation of the Anglo-Saxon and Indian peoples appears inadvisable, and if a return to frankly autocratic methods is equally so, then we are left with the only remaining expedient of co-operation. But how far is a genuine co-operation possible? The problem is psychological. British independence and initiative are opposed by Indian sensitiveness and mistrust. And until the question can be approached from the human end, and India can recognise on our part a sincere desire to allow her people to work out their own destiny, there can be no solution.

The thorny problems of immigration, inter-marriage, social and political equality, and the growth of population are dealt with in a like temper of impartiality. The instinct of self-preservation manifested by the white races on the one hand coupled with a natural sensitiveness to unfair racial discrimination evinced by the coloured peoples on the other, must be noted as fruitful causes of friction and unrest. Mr. Oldham declares himself frankly doubtful how far equality of opportunity is really compatible with complete social segregation, pointing out pertinently enough that impassable social barriers render any adequate measure of understanding and sympathy between black and white.

So, again, with political aspirations. It should be clear that a man's colour bears no relation to his capacity as a voter. But the unwillingness of dominant races to grant full political equality to subject peoples is due in the last resort to fear, while the desire of such peoples to obtain political rights has its roots in a galling sense of inferiority which is inevitably present when these rights are withheld.

The population question clearly presents difficulties which are impatient of any light-hearted solution. Checks, says Mr. Oldham, there must be. But as to the nature of these checks there is room for wide differences of opinion. We are assured that neither wars of extermination, nor the increased use of contraceptives on the part of the better educated sections of the community can attain the desired limitation. Only an increasing partnership of the races pledged, as they must be, to a great co-operative struggle against those forces of nature which are inimical to human progress, can solve the problem.

At the conclusion of his full survey of the present world situation, Mr. Oldham devotes two chapters to the consideration first of guiding principles and then of immediate practical steps. Side by side with the significance of race he sets the importance of the individual, stressing once more the fact of fundamental unity and the crying need for a recognition by all peoples of a common purpose of world service. Among practical measures to be taken immediately he pleads eloquently for the conversion of our own minds, the acquisition of wider knowledge as to actual conditions, adventurous attempts at racial co-operation, the formation of a right public opinion through education and the press, and above all for an adequate presentation of the Christian Gospel.

In conclusion Mr. Oldham lays it down emphatically that world comradeship and loyalty to a common purpose must be based on a religious foundation. In the Christian Church as it exists in the mind of God he finds the world-wide community of the loyal by whose efforts moral and spiritual unity can be ultimately attained. And the book closes with a significant reminder that the Christian Gospel is not only for every man, but has to do with every aspect of human life. Only through this 'wholeness of outlook' can the Church of this or any age hope to rise to the full measure of its responsibilities whether to God or man.

W. Maurice Pryke.

ESSAYS IN EARLY CHRISTIAN HISTORY.*

The author of this book is Professor of Latin in the University of Chicago, and he claims to deal with some important questions of Early Church history from the standpoint of an 'unprejudiced classicist,' who is frequently dissatisfied with the evaluation of evidence which he has found to be accepted with little question by ecclesiastical historians.

In his introductory chapter, 'On Materials and Methods,' Dr. Merrill calls attention to the 'slight and insecure foundation of substantially contemporary evidence' upon which 'the superstructure of the narrative of the first two centuries is perforce erected' (p. 5), and enunciates some useful canons for observation in the criticism and estimation of such evidence as there is. His combination of penetrating and drastic criticism, which loses nothing by a style which exhibits somewhat excessive deference towards the authors whose opinions he would so decisively refute, is such as to suggest that he entertains an admiration for Gibbon. From the student's point of view it is to be regretted that in several instances Dr. Merrill, in criticizing the views of other authors, or even of a single individual, has not thought it worth while to quote the precise reference, or to give the title of the book referred to, or even to mention the author's name.

Professor Merrill's second chapter sets out with admirable clearness the main and familiar features in the attitude of ancient Rome towards religion and religious cults. Although he does not claim for his book that it is a connected historical survey, there is nevertheless a common thesis underlying and connecting together the greater part of it, *viz.* chapters II—VIII. The Professor claims to show that throughout the first two centuries there was nothing distinctive in the official attitude of Rome towards Christianity; that there is no evidence for the existence, during this period, of any sort of law or special precedent in accordance with which any Emperor might feel bound to act, or in fact did act, in the treatment of Christians; and that until the end of the second century, although persecution was going on intermittently, there was no general legal persecution 'for the Name.' Christians would tend so to think of and describe it, because they were punished for nothing they could regard as wrong-doing. In calling attention to the fact that Rome recognized the right of voluntary association in *collegia* for business, social, or religious purposes, so long as these were not inconsistent with good citizenship, Dr. Merrill says that a *collegium licitum* differed from a *collegium illicitum* much as in the United States an incorporated society differs from one unincorporated. 'Too many writers have jumped to the conclusion that because the *collegium licitum* was a "licensed" or "recognized" society, the *collegium illicitum* must have led at all times an "illicit" and furtive existence, in the face of the law, as a prohibited society' (p. 53*f*). The *collegium illicitum* was not necessarily one driven to hiding in dens and caves of the earth, though all such *collegia illicita* might be disbanded at any time, if, in the opinion of the proper Roman official, public order should so require; and only when such associations were temporarily interdicted, as in Bithynia in Trajan's time, would Christians be persecuted for membership in a *collegium illicitum*. When Tertullian writes that judges said of Christians, 'You have no right to exist' (*non licet esse vos*), he is dealing only with 'court-made law' which it was within the

* *Essays in Early Christian History*, by Elmer Truesdell Merrill, M.A., Hon. LL.D. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London, 1924. (Price 12/6).

power of magistrates to disregard if they thought fit. Tertullian 'has no notion of the existence of any standing legislation against Christianity.'

Dr. Merrill devotes a chapter to the Persecution by Nero, and accepts the account of Tacitus as genuine and authentic. He urges that Dio Cassius mentions the Fire, but says nothing of the following persecution of incendiaries, and that the bare reference of Suetonius that Nero put Christians to death, 'a class of men devoted to a new and baleful superstition,' comprises the total knowledge of the Neronian persecution Christians possessed down to Sulpicius Severus. The Professor will not allow that *I Peter*, despite 'the fiery trial,' necessarily refers to the Neronian persecution at all, and argues that Orosius in the fifth century is the first evidence in all antiquity that Nero extended the persecution beyond Rome, and that the testimony of Orosius is worthless. Of the passage in Tertullian, *Ad Nationes* i, 7, 'while everything else established by Nero has been wiped out, this only has survived,' the Professor denies that it deals with the legal status of Christians; the phrase '*institutum Neronianum*' refers merely to the bad reputation Christians gained by reason of Nero's charge of arson. It is surprising that although Dr. Merrill refers to and criticizes a statement in the late Professor Gwatkin's *Early Church History*, and insists that Tacitus' narrative is supported only by the brief sentence of Suetonius referred to above, he passes over unnoticed Professor Gwatkin's assertion on p. 80 in Vol. I of the *Early Church History* that 'Suetonius, however, plainly tells us that Nero punished the Christians by a new and "permanent police regulation" which cannot well have been required except to make a new crime of Christianity itself.'

Dr. Merrill is concerned to deny that there is any evidence for anything like a persecution of Christians by Domitian. There is no reason to suppose that Suetonius and Dio are suppressing anything when they give no indication that Domitian's persecution extended beyond the aristocrats whom he felt he had reason to fear, or beyond court circles. This, we remember, was Professor Gwatkin's view, who, however, regarded the *Apocalypse* as referring to the Neronian persecution, whereas Dr. Merrill thinks it fits the time of Domitian, but in a few very general sentences denies that it can possibly have any evidential value as history. He also insists that the 'unexpected and repeated troubles and hindrances' which delayed the writing of *I Clement*, do not suggest anything terrible, and says that later pages show that the author could speak plainly of θλίψεις from without. We feel that the Professor's case is far from unanswerable. The *Apocalypse* cannot so easily be ignored; the literature of which it is a type frequently had its inspiration in a definite historical situation of the kind a persecution would provide. Dr. Merrill also admits of Domitian that 'the exaltation of the reigning Augustus as a present deity was his particular passion,' and he was 'disposed to promote it by every insistence at his command.' Emperor-worship was particularly strong in Asia, the province to which the *Apocalypse* was directed. And if, as the Professor admits, Domitilla was a Christian, it is hard to see why her husband, Flavius Clemens, more likely suffered for Judaism, though it is true that sympathy with either Judaism or Christianity might have made him careless of the Emperor-worship and have led to his attitude being described as *contemptissima inertia*. Certainly, Dio includes Flavius Clemens and Domitilla among the 'many others' who were condemned, having 'drifted into the practices of the Jews,' but Dr. Merrill has already argued that Christianity would most probably not be well known, if known at all, to the average educated Roman of social standing, and this to defend Dio from a charge of unfairness towards Christianity. He can hardly, then,

quote Dio's evidence as of value as to the precise form of 'atheism' of which Flavius and his wife were suspected. In the chapters on Trajan's persecution in Bithynia as known from Pliny's letter and the Emperor's Rescript, and on the Rescript of Hadrian to Minicius Fundanus, which he accepts as genuine, Professor Merrill argues that these are quite inconsistent with any theory that Christians were at that time, or had ever been, legally punished in accordance with a standing principle as proscribed outlaws.

Space will not allow of a full description of what is the most suggestive chapter in the book, namely, that which challenges the accepted date of 95-6 for the Epistle of Clement of Rome which Dr. Merrill regards as contemporaneous with the *Shepherd* of Hermas. He finds no good evidence for the existence of the traditional Clement, in *Vis.* ii, 4, 3, of the *Shepherd*: 'You are to write out two booklets and send one to Clement and one to Grapte. Clement is then to send it to the cities outside, for that is his function.' Dr. Merrill thinks this Clement cannot be identified with his traditional namesake, for on the evidence of the Muratorian Canon he regards the *Shepherd* as dating from the middle of the second century. Origen, he says, is the first to make the unwarranted identification. He further argues that trouble in the Corinthian Church is more likely to have arisen in the second century, than at a date when many presbyters might be living who were appointed by Apostles. The reference in *I Clement* of the martyrdom of SS. Peter and Paul 'in our own generation,' Professor Merrill explains as meaning no more than 'in our own time' as contrasted with the time of Moses and David of whom he had just written. We confess to a feeling of suspicion at the easy way in which the Professor disposes of the weighty evidence collected by Dr. Lightfoot to show that Polycarp knew and quoted *I Clement.* He does not examine the list of identities and similarities, but declares roundly that some are not worth considering, while others are mere coincidences in writers steeped in Biblical language, and even if there is any direct imitation, the passages do not show which writer copied from the other. He holds that at best this is only corroborative evidence, and does not vitiate the other indications of a later date for *I Clement.* Having seen the page proofs, we would refer our readers to Canon Streeter's new book on *The Four Gospels*, p. 528, for some objections to this late date for the Epistle of Clement, which Canon Streeter does not accept. Whilst realizing the scanty and hazardous nature of the evidence upon which those theories are based which Dr. Merrill labours to overthrow, we do not feel convinced that he has succeeded. Nevertheless, he has written not only a valuable but also an interesting book.

J.S.B.

GROWING PAINS.*

The discovery of Mr. Studdert Kennedy among the writers of little Books for Lent reading may surprise those who know him best as the author of *Lies, The Hardest Part,* and *Rough Rhymes of a Padre.* This slim volume, decorously bound in dark blue, and sponsored by the Bishop of London, will find its way into many a suburban drawing-room and country rectory whither Mr. Kennedy's earlier books have not yet penetrated. And the result, we predict, will be altogether salutary. The purpose of the book is to stimulate hard thinking, to give the reader '

**The Word and the Work.* G. A. Studdart Kennedy, M.C. (Longmans, Green & Co. 1925. Price, 2/6.)

pain in the mind,' and so to enable him to grow, if not in grace, at least in common sense and love of his fellow-men.

It is a pity that the rules of grammar are flouted in the introduction, and that the proofs have not been corrected with greater care. We could wish also that Mr. Kennedy had not allowed a gift of true eloquence to degenerate on occasion into something not far removed from oratory of the baser sort. And perhaps to some it will seem unfortunate first to attribute the Fourth Gospel to John the son of Zebedee (without a hint of other possibilities) and then to identify this John with the writer of the *Apocalypse*—an identification once described by the Dean of St. Paul's as 'one of the strangest mysteries of New Testament criticism.' But these defects are of slight moment when set against the positive merits of this stimulating and important volume.

Mr. Kennedy has been reading *Christus Veritas*, and his chapters show many points of contact with Dr. Temple's thought. His book is an expansion, interpretation and application to twentieth century conditions of thoughts contained in six verses of the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. At the outset we are offered what, from the literary point of view, is admittedly a clumsy and long-winded paraphrase of the Gospel's opening words, but for all that a paraphrase which helps materially to a truer understanding of the Evangelist's thought: 'Right at the heart of the ultimate reality there was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be world without end a Person expressing a rational purpose which men can in some measure understand.'

'At its heart the world is not mad but sane.' Here in a sentence we have the essential working faith of ordinary people. Where this conviction is lacking, life becomes a chaos, purposeless, meaningless, horrible. For many to-day the conditions under which they live make such a faith practically impossible. Thus, 'while we must not mistake the Kingdom of Comfort for the Kingdom of Christ,' Christians are bound to concern themselves with social problems. To our shame we have allowed ourselves to think of beauty as a luxury for the few. But 'beauty is as necessary as bread.' And (since beauty is one of the proofs that the world is sane) the cry that men are used to ugliness and do not notice it affords no justification of things as they are.

Moreover, if there be a God, He must be knowable. 'The "Supreme Being" whom everybody acknowledges but nobody cares a rap about' is less than useless. If man cannot see life's purpose revealed to him by God, he will invent imaginary purposes of his own. The plea of ignorance will not serve. Life demands a great hypothesis for its explanation. And 'if Christ does not reveal to us the nature of reality, we must find someone who does.'

But further, assuming that the Christian hypothesis is accepted, it must be of universal application. 'God made mountains, stars and rivers, but man made machines.' Here is the root fallacy of much modern thinking. We refuse to see God's hand in scientific progress. Little men have put the discoveries of great minds to purposes which would 'make a decent savage blush with shame.' Our selfishness has made of each new discovery a source of weakness rather than of strength. 'Everywhere we are surrounded by the sacraments of our sin, the outward and visible signs of our inward and spiritual disgrace.' Yet, despite human selfishness and folly, God is winning. He has 'made of the world one body which, if it is to live at all, must learn to live exactly in the manner in which St. Paul describes the life of the Church.' Hence it is the work

of religion to give to the complex relationships of modern life their moral and spiritual meaning. And congregations which are nothing better than 'little herds of like-minded people snuggling up to one another for comfort and warmth as animals do,' have not begun to understand the meaning of the challenge of Christ.

The supreme need is for spiritual vision. Each one of us builds his own world out of the things to which he attends; but to be 'crazy about Christ' is the highest form of sanity. If the mind of Christ is the reality of things, then 'Advent, the coming of God,' is a more accurate and scientific name for the creative process than Evolution.' But to understand Christ we must see the Cross as the master key to the riddle of the universe. True life is indeed impossible apart from the willingness to die, 'since the man who holds his life dear is not living at all, only putting off death.'

According to Mr. Kennedy, a new quality of social life is the true hall-mark of Christianity. Hence the Church and Christ stand or fall together. And superior persons who despise the Church, desire a desert island for the cultivation of their own spiritual life, and find it 'dreadful to have little curates in black clothes running about trying to be like Jesus Christ,' are in grave danger of bartering the substance for the shadow. We are to regard 'the dream of a new and better social order as as much an essential part of the Christian life as prayer and communion with God.' And here we must see the true significance of sacraments. It is the presence of Christ in the bread as yet unconsecrated which the world denies. And yet (as Mr. Kennedy finely says) 'the whole of our Social Order is in the Bread of the Altar which waits the act of the Christian community who lift it up to God.'

We are brought, then, to a crisis—to a choice between the glory of Christ and the glory of the world. Do we indeed serve Christ crucified or the God of popular thinking, 'the Napoleon of eternity, the untrammelled Egotist, who is what we would be if we could have our way'? Mr. Kennedy is right in telling us that too often we 'think of the Christ in glory as different from the Christ who came in great humility, as though His power and His glory could change their nature.' Here is the cardinal mistake of religious people. And we must make our choice between 'the glory of Reason, Patience and Love, and the glory of Force and Wrath and Fear.' Half-measures will not serve. 'Timid murder' cannot save the world. 'Compromise without repentance and consecration' will prove of no avail. Christ must reign or be crucified forthwith. There is no third choice.

W. M. PRYKE.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

PROFESSOR GOUDGE AND MIRACLE.

Professor Goudge's contention is that 'the objections commonly urged against miracle from the side of science may be urged more strongly against moral freedom.'

Indeed, they *are* urged; and 'behaviouristic' psychology (or the interpretation of volition in terms of stimulus and mechanical reaction) is merely the importation of 'deterministic' scientific method into the study of human behaviour. 'Freedom' would indeed upset the psychologist's calculations quite as much as 'the supernatural' would upset those of the physicist or chemist.

Hence (Professor Goudge has a right to ask) if we admit 'freedom' into the psychological realm, why not admit 'the supernatural' into the physical realm?

For the best of reasons. If I believe in 'freedom' I do so because it seems to me that I experience it: I seem to myself to act freely. This view, though it may be, as Sir C. S. Sherrington says it is, a 'naïve inference,' is at any rate based on experience, and commends itself, in spite of the psychologists, to common sense.

But in the physical realm my experience does not discover the supernatural—at least, *not in the shape of 'interferences.'* In this realm things move, without experienced exceptions, in regular uninterrupted sequences.

I admit that it *seems* inconsistent to admit spontaneity, or freedom, or unpredictability, in the one sphere and to deny it to the other. But this is really nothing more than to say that the organic and the inorganic realms are dissimilar. Freedom (we know not how) exists, in varying degrees, in organisms; but even they cannot play fast and loose with physical law: they cannot, for example, create energy, but only convert and redirect it. I can move my arm, but only by utilising the same physico-chemical laws as prevail outside my body, and if there is a lesion in a particular part of my nervous tissue, I shall not be able to raise it at all, however much I may 'will' the movement.

No doubt I shall be told that 'mind' has remarkable power over 'body,' and so forth. But it was to block up this avenue into a side-issue that I took Aquinas' definition of miracle as a basis for discussion. If a miracle is something which has its cause 'outside the order of the whole of created nature' (which seems to me, in spite of Professor Goudge's reluctance to admit that the language is clear, a quite straightforward and explicit definition), then it is no mere organic or psychological marvel, for life and mind are alike parts of nature.

I feel strongly that unless this (traditional and orthodox) definition is accepted we shall never get much further with the discussion over miracle; for it will always be possible to enlarge your term without notice and, under cover of the change, to smuggle in any number of phenomena which no doubt are real facts, but which are not real miracles. But perhaps it is useless to protest; for here again we have an instance of the fact that ideas change more quickly than words.

J. C. HARDWICK.

Partington Vicarage. *Feb. 1st*, 1925.

THE CHURCH OF ROME AND HOLY SCRIPTURE.

SIR,

I have to thank Canon Goudge for his courteous reply to my letter. As, on his own showing, he used the words 'the Church' in a 'strictly limited' sense, the question as to the teaching of the non-Anglican churches with regard to the origin and authority of the Bible loses its immediate importance. There is, however, one point on which I must join issue with Canon Goudge. He doubts if 'obscurantism' in this matter is *de fide* in the Church of Rome. Beyond all doubt it is. Fr. S. J. Hunter, S.J., in his *Outlines of Dogmatic Theology*—a learned work (in three volumes) which received the *imprimatur* of the Archbishop of Westminster, and which distinguishes between what is and what is not *de fide*—goes fully into the whole question (Vol. I, pp. 185-203). The teaching of his Church, as he expounds it, is that God is the Author of the Canonical Scriptures and that He uses the various writers, not as amanuenses, but as private secretaries. 'The works,' says Fr. Hunter, 'are distinguishable in style,

although they belong to the same Author Who stirred the writer to undertake the task, secured him the requisite knowledge, and supervised the work while it was in progress.' 'The whole subject,' adds Fr. Hunter, 'of the Catholic doctrine concerning the nature of Holy Scripture . . . will be found in the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, beginning *Providentissimus Deus*, and issued November 18, 1923.' We here learn that God by His supernatural influence so stirred and moved the human writers, and so assisted them, that they rightly conceived in their minds that, and that only, which He bade them write, and that they willed to write it faithfully, and that with unfailing truth they expressed themselves aptly; for otherwise God would not be the Author of the whole of the Sacred Scriptures. 'The absolute inerrancy of Scripture' is a necessary inference from this teaching. 'Since, then, God is the Author of the Scripture, whatever the Scripture conveys to us is true.' It follows that the second chapter of *Genesis* is 'true and literal history,' and that the sun and moon *did* stand still at the bidding of Joshua. If this is not 'obscurantism' I do not know what that word means.

As regards the wider question—the analogy between 'the Church' and 'the nation,' as subjects for definition, holds good up to a certain point, but can easily be pressed too far. In this country, for example, there is no one section of the community which arrogates to itself the title of 'the nation' and regards all other sections as beyond the national pale. And when men talk about 'the English nation' I have a fairly clear idea of what they mean; whereas when they talk about 'the Church' I have but the haziest idea, unless the context happens to be illuminating or unless I happen to be acquainted with the speaker's views. But Canon Goudge says that he would be glad to deal with the wider question; and I hope he will do so, as there is much need for clear thinking on this point.

E. G. A. HOLMES.

RESERVATION OF THE SACRAMENT.

SIR,

Your reference to Dr. Stone on the question of Reservation demands a footnote. Dr. Darwell Stone is the chairman of the Federation of Catholic Priests founded in 1917. Its objects are given in *Mowbray's Annual* for 1923 as follows: 'For priests in communion with the see of Canterbury, for mutual support and to maintain and defend the doctrine and practice of the Church as indicated in the following terms of membership:

(1) To maintain the doctrines of the Perpetual Virginity of the Mother of God and of the bodily Resurrection of our Lord.

(2) To promote the practice of the open and public Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament.

(3) To uphold and teach publicly the practice of the Invocation of Saints.

(4) To teach and practise the regular use of the Sacrament of Penance and the observation of the rule of Fasting Communion.

(5) To contend for Catholic order and discipline in the Church and to combat all breaches of the same.

The Vice-Chairman of this organization is the Rev. H. P. Bull, and the Secretary is the Rev. W. Dudley Dixon, Vicar of Glossop.

P.H.B.

[We regret that lack of space precludes the publication of several letters. —ED., *M.C.*]